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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS ON STOCK 
RETURN AND COUNTRY OUTPUT 
by 
Junnan Zhao 
 
Adviser: Professor Tao Wang 
Exchange rate movements are widely believed to be a major source of uncertainty at both 
micro- and macro-economic levels. At the microeconomic level, corporate managers controlling 
risk and investors seeking to hedge their portfolios are both obviously interested in estimates of a 
firm’s exchange rate exposure ̶ i.e., how much of the value of a firm will be affected by exchange 
rate movements. At the macroeconomic level, a currency appreciation may have a contractionary 
effect on a country's output. 
Chapter 1 tests whether the launch of the euro around 1999 significantly reduced stock market 
volatility and exchange rate risk exposure to eurozone firms. The experiment analyzes monthly 
stock returns of 6574 nonfinancial firms from eleven eurozone countries, six non-euro European 
countries, and two countries outside of Europe (the United States and Japan) over the period of 
1993-2011. I find that, near the introduction of the euro, eurozone firms had a larger decrease in 
market beta compared to other regions. Surprisingly, however, this decrease was only a temporary 
effect. Leading up to the crisis of 2008, the eurozone market beta had already shot up back to its 
previous level in the pre-euro period. Relative to other regions, the eurozone firms that experienced 
less increase in the exchange rate risk exposure after the euro's initial adoption also experienced a 
larger increase in exchange rate risk exposure during the crisis period. In addition, I examine the 
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determinants of firm-level exchange exposure in a dynamic context for eurozone firms. The results 
indicate that exposure is correlated with components such as firm size, foreign sales, foreign assets, 
debt to total assets ratio, but all these relationships vary across different periods. 
Chapter 2 investigates several existing exchange rate risk exposure issues in the context of US 
multinational firms with a new five-factor Fama-French model. A portfolio-level analysis is 
employed to eliminate the key source of time-variant factors that may exist in the first- and second-
regression approaches employed by the existing articles. I find that (1) the relationship between 
the foreign sales ratio and exchange exposure may not be linear ̶ i.e., a firm with a higher foreign 
sales ratio is not necessarily exposed more to the exchange rate risk, and (2) a broad exchange rate 
index captures the exchange rate changes more comprehensively in estimation ̶ i.e., a firm could 
have statistically significant exposure to some currency even when it has no foreign sales in the 
country with that currency. In addition, new firm-level exchange exposure evidences are found on 
the effects of lagged period, return horizon, and large volatile period.  
Chapter 3 seeks to determine whether a negative long-run effect of real appreciation on output 
can be identified once accounted for the following factors: (1) reverse causation from output to the 
real effective exchange rate, (2) spurious correlation with third factors such as capital account 
shocks, and (3) temporary contractionary effects of appreciation. Six vector autoregression (VAR) 
models are built to identify the sources of shocks and to control for important external shocks. 
Based on the results obtained from the VAR models, the response of output to a real appreciation 
is based not only on one single predominant channel but on several different channels, such as 
inflation, capital account, and money supply. A finding that real appreciation has led to economic 
contraction in China does not mean that the authorities should simply discourage real exchange 
rate appreciation.  
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CHAPTER 1 DOES THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO REDUCE FIRM-LEVEL 
EXCHANGE RATE RISK EXPOSURE? 
1.1 Introduction  
The exchange rate risk exposure is an important topic that has received greater attention in 
financial studies in the last 10 years. Surprisingly, few empirical papers have investigated it in the 
context of the Euro. One of the central motivations for the creation of the euro was to enable 
European firms to avoid the transaction loss caused by the uncertainties of exchange rate 
movements. Nonetheless, the eurozone crisis which began from late 2009 raised an important 
question: did joining a monetary union in terms of gains in liquidity and financial stability 
continuously benefit most firms? This article performs a firm-level dynamic analysis of the Euro's 
impact on exchange rate exposure worldwide from 1993 to 2011.  
Showing such an impact of common currency adoption on exchange rate exposure is 
challenging because, firstly, there is an exchange rate exposure puzzle. Financial theory predicts 
that firm value should be affected by foreign exchange rate risk. However, existing empirical 
studies to date have had limited success in identifying significant exposure of nonfinancial firms 
with regard to unexpected exchange rate movements. Jorion (1990), Dominguez (1998), He and 
Ng (1998), Griffin and Stulz (2001), Bodnar and Wong (2003), Dominguez and Tesar (2001a, 
2001b, 2006), Ihrig and Prior (2005), Doidge et al. (2006), Bartram and Bodnar (2007), Hutson 
and O'Driscoll (2010), Bartram and Bodnar (2012), and others have various findings regarding the 
nature of the exchange rate exposure, and highlight the need for a systematic comparison of 
exchange rate exposure across time, countries, and determinants. This paper examines the 
exchange rate risk exposure in a very broad context. Our sample comprises 6,574 nonfinancial 
firms from eleven euro zone countries, six non-euro European countries, and two countries outside 
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of Europe (the United States and Japan). The full sample period covers the pre-euro period (1993-
1998), post-euro period (1999-2007), and the financial crisis period (2008-2011). 
Secondly, defining which firms were affected by the euro's launch is a big and complex project. 
A firm’s stock return can be affected by unexpected exchange rate movements both directly and 
indirectly. Dominguez and Tesar (2006) indicate that even firms that do not have international 
business directly could be affected by exchange rate through competition with foreign firms in the 
same industry. According to a high degree of detail on geographic segment data on foreign sales, 
we group sample firms into two categories: multinational corporations with European sales and 
non-multinational corporations (without European sales). 1  Since the Euro is introduced in a 
specific set of European countries only, firms with foreign activities in these countries are expected 
to be affected differently in degree by the introduction of the Euro than other firms, and foreign 
sales or assets in Europe proxy for this euro currency exposure. 
Thirdly, as with market beta and the exchange rate risk exposure, the relationship between the 
exchange rate risk exposure and its determinants vary with time. Different from all the other 
existing research, in order to gain a full picture of the movements of market risk and exchange rate 
exposures, we employ the rolling regression with a window of 36 months to check for the changes 
in the exposure reflectors over time. For the first stage regression only, this yields 193 times of 
estimation for each firm and 351,067 times of estimation for the full sample. 
In the first stage, we show that the eurozone firms, as well as the firms in other areas, experience 
a decrease in the stock market risk temporarily around 1999-2002. Since then, market betas rose 
back to their former level gradually before the crisis of 2008. The exchange rate risk exposure of 
                                                 
1 Multinational corporations with foreign sales but not in Europe are not included in sample firms. This is because the 
impact of the Euro's launch on them is complicated and ambiguous. It's hard to expect whether there is an impaction 
or not and to distinguish the channel of the impaction, so they cannot be classified into either group in this study. 
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the eurozone firms exhibits a smaller increase after the euro's launch but a larger increase during 
the financial crisis period relative to other regions. 
The second stage of our dynamic analysis focuses on the determinants of exchange rate risk 
exposure. We take the estimated coefficients from the first stage regressions and regress these on 
a variety of potential explanatory variables. A relationship between foreign sales (foreign income, 
etc.) and exposure is discovered, but its size changes over time and its sign differs between 
positive-exposure and negative-exposure firms. This helps explain why it is so difficult to identify 
the determinants of the exposure. Among the significant results, foreign sales and foreign income 
have a positive impact on the exposure at most of the time. Foreign assets and debt ratio, however, 
have a negative impact at most of the time. The exchange rate exposure of a multinational firm 
incorporates the effects of any hedging activity undertaken by the firm. Hence, for a multinational 
firm having dominant foreign sales effect over other effect (such as import effect), we might see a 
low exchange risk exposure corresponding to a high foreign sales. However, the big exchange 
exposure caused by high debt ratio and large foreign assets is difficult to hedge.    
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our research approach and data sources. 
Section 3 investigates the market-level stock risk and foreign exchange rate volatility.  In section 
4 and 5, we present the firm-level market risk and exchange rate risk exposure results and give an 
explanation. Robust checks and conclusions are offered in section 5 and 6, respectively.  
 
1.2 Model and Data 
In early studies, exchange rate exposure is defined in terms of a firm's risk of fluctuation in the 
foreign exchange rate. Adler and Dumas (1984) present a method of estimating a firm's foreign 
exchange exposure on the basis of a one-factor market regression model of the stock returns on 
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the changes in exchange rates (the prices of currencies). The obtained coefficient of exchange rate 
changes in one-factor model measures the firm’s total exposure to exchange rates. 
 
 Model  
Jorion (1990) upgrades the one-factor model into a two-factor regression model distinguishing 
the effect of exchange rate risk inherent in the market index and the effect directly through 
exchange rate changes. The obtained coefficient of exchange rate changes is so called residual 
exposure, in excess of the total market’s reaction to exchange rate movements.2 This two-factor 
model is later used in an extensive body of work, such as Griffin and Stulz (2001), Bodnar and 
Wong (2003), Dominguez and Tesar (2001a, 2001b, 2006), Bartram and Karolyi (2006), Doidge 
et al. (2006), Bartram and Bodnar (2007, 2012), Hutson and O'Driscoll (2010) and others. In this 
paper, we employ the following widely used two-factor regression model to measure exchange 
rate exposure: 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X       ,             (1) 
where 
s
ijtR  is the stock return of firm i in country j at time t, 
m
jtR  is the return of market portfolio 
in country j, 
jtX  is the percentage change of exchange rate of country j's currency, and ij  is firm 
i's market beta. Conditioning on market movements, this model well reflects the change in stock 
returns explained by exchange rate movements in coefficient
ij . For i=1,…,N firms, the 
disturbances are not only obviously autocorrelated but may also be correlated across stocks. This 
model is an unrestricted SUR model (the equations are linked only by their disturbances) with the 
                                                 
2 Dominguez and Tesar (2006) call it marginal exposure in this context. They consider the advantage of marginal 
exposure is allowing one to distinguish between the direct effects of exchange rate changes and the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks that simultaneously affect firm value and exchange rates. Contrast to marginal exposure, total 
exposure measures the exposure of all firms as a group. 
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same regressors in every equation. In this special case, GLS and maximum likelihood estimators 
are simply equation by equation OLS because all equations have identical regressors X. They are 
no more efficient than OLS.3 
 
 Data 
We collect data for all non-financial firms 4  which publicly traded during January 1993-
December 2011 from eleven eurozone countries (Austria Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain),5  six non-eurozone Europe 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom),6 and two 
outside Europe countries (Japan and the United States).7 A total of 31,323 non-financial firms is 
our raw data sample, of which 5,028 firms are from eurozone area, 5,615 are from non-eurozone 
Europe area, and 20,680 are from outside the Europe area, i.e. Japan and the U.S. The sample 
period from January 1993 to December 2011 is chosen in order to minimize any specification 
problems stemming from the ERM crisis of 1992/1993,8 and also help maintain a reasonable 
                                                 
3 William H. Greene gives a proof and a further discussion in his "Econometrics Analysis" 5th edition, Chapter 14.2.2 
and 14.2.5. "In this special case that all regressors are identical, generalized least squares (GLS) is equivalent to 
equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS)", "GMM estimation is irrelevant", and "Maximum likelihood 
estimation does not have any advantage compared to OLS". 
4 Financial firms are characterized by different attitudes towards financial risks from non-financial firms given their 
business objectives. 
5 Greece is excluded from the eurozone sample, because that it lunched euro in an inconsistent year (2001) with other 
eurozone countries, also, it does not have enough firm records existing from 1993 until 2011. For the same reason, 
Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Estonia which have joined eurozone since 2007, 2008, 2008, 2009, and 2011, 
respectively, are excluded in our sample too. 
6 Denmark and the United Kingdom joined EU in 1973. Sweden and Poland joined EU in 1995 and 2004 respectively. 
Norway and Switzerland do not join EU. Other non-eurozone Europe countries, such as Iceland, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Turkey, etc. don't have enough firm data before 1999, so they are excluded from our non-eurozone data sample. 
7 Our rationalization for including only firms from Japan and the US is in part from the fact that these two markets 
dominate the trade and capital flows between Europe and the rest of the world, and also in part from the pre-euro data 
availability of other countries 
8 On 16 September 1992, the British Conservative government was forced to withdraw the pound sterling from the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) since they were unable to keep it above its agreed lower limit. 
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amount of non-financial firms in our test sample due to the firm-level data availability earlier than 
1993.   
Firms with a non-zero amount of foreign sales, trade, services, or investment in the eurozone 
are expected to be affected differently in degree by the introduction of the Euro than other firms. 
Hence, firstly, we use foreign sales or assets in Europe as a proxy for the Euro currency exposure 
following Bartram and Karolyi (2006).9 In each area, we define the MNCs sample based on foreign 
sales and foreign assets in Europe. Thomson One Worldscope contains 10-scale geographic 
segment data for a large number of firms worldwide. We calculate each firm's annual Europe sales 
according to their geographic segment sales.10  Firms showing non-zero foreign Europe sales 
continuously across all three sub-periods: the pre-euro period (1993-1998), post-euro period 
(1999-2007), and the financial crisis period, (2008-2011) are finally used to compose our MNCs 
samples of three areas.11  
Secondly, in order to benchmark the effects of the Euro on the MNCs samples, we select the 
firms without any foreign sales from 1993 to 2011 to compose our non-MNCs samples in each 
corresponding area. Although the profit of non-MNCs cannot be affected by exchange rate 
movements via foreign sales directly, it could be affected directly either via exports or imports. 
Dominguez and Tesar (2006) also argue that even firms that do not conduct international business 
                                                 
9 Bartram and Karolyi (2006) use foreign sales or assets in Europe rather than eurozone as a proxy for Euro currency 
exposure though they "have finer segment data on sales and assets specific to Euro-area countries". Their choice 
"stems from the fact that the much smaller breadth of the sample with such finer segment data". Here, we consider an 
additional reason for following this choice in our study is the fact that the euro has been using (or using as accounting 
currency) broadly in non-eurozone European countries at varying degrees of foreign sales, trade, or services 
transactions. 
10 See Bartram and Karolyi (2006, page 527) for detailed steps of calculation. 
11 Based on our choice of single equation-by-equation ordinary least squares methodology and our purpose to examine 
the impact of euro' launch on firm value as well as euro's performance in crisis, the firms we selected into the sample 
must publicly trade across all three sub-periods with at least 48 monthly observations within each sub-period. In this 
way, we also keep a balanced panel data sample and minimize any technical problems raised by unbalanced data in 
econometrics. 
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directly could be affected by the exchange rate through competition with foreign firms in the same 
industry. Therefore, we expect to see that the non-MNCs experience exchange rate exposure as 
well, but with a lower exchange rate exposure relative to the MNCs.  
Finally, the eurozone sample comprises 161 MNCs and 194 Non-MNCs; the non-eurozone 
Europe sample comprises 147 MNCs and 160 non-MNCs; and the outside Europe sample 
comprises 141 MNCs and 1,014 non-MNCs. In total, 1,817 non-financial firms are included in our 
core test sample. Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics of MNCs and Non-MNCs in the test 
sample by areas. We compare them in terms of market capitalization, total assets, total sales, 
foreign sales in percentage to total sales, and foreign sales in Europe (hereafter, Europe sales) in 
percentage to total sales. MNCs tend to be large firms which have higher market capitalization, 
total assets, and sales compared to non-MNCs across all regions. For example, the median market 
capitalization, total assets, and total sales of MNCs are €1225.6 million, €1198.8 million, and 
€1170.9 million, respectively, while the median values for the non-MNCs are €131.8 million, 
264.5 million, and 258.9 million. The MNCs has 56.0% of foreign sales and 30.6% Europe sales 
in median, but there are significant differences across areas: median foreign sales and Europe sales 
for MNCs are 63.0% and 36% in eurozone, 62.8% and 36% in non-eurozone Europe, and only 
40.6% and 21.4% in outside of Europe. 
Market capitalization (year-end), total assets, total debt, foreign sales, foreign assets, foreign 
income, export, and geographic segment 1-10 descriptions and sales are annual data, while firm-
level stock returns, market indices returns (value-weighted) are monthly data. They are all taken 
from Thomson One Banker (Thomson financial, Datastream, and Worldscope) over the period of 
1993M1-2011M12.The exchange rate (nominal effective) data are monthly obtained from the 
IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
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1.3 Stock Market Risk and Foreign Exchange Volatility 
Table 1.2 presents the means and standard deviations of stock market indices returns by areas 
over three periods: pre-euro period (1993M1-1998M12), post-euro period (1999M1-2007M12), 
and crisis period (2008M1-2011M12).12 And we also use F-test to exam if the change of stock 
market volatility is statistically significant. In the eurozone, market indices return variances are 
significantly smaller after the Euro's launch in Austria, Spain, Italy, and Portugal; significantly 
larger in Germany, Finland, and Luxemburg; and not significantly different in Belgium, France, 
Ireland, and the Netherlands. In the non-eurozone Europe, market indices return variances are 
significantly smaller after Euro's launch in Switzerland and Poland and not significantly different 
in Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. In the outside of Europe, market indices 
return variances are significantly smaller after Euro's launch in Japan but not significantly different 
in the United States. If we test according to general market indices of Eurozone, Europe, and world, 
the return variances are not significantly different before and after Euro's launch. 
Continuing from Table 1.2, Table 1.3 provides the means and standard deviations of exchange 
rate changes in percentage. In the eurozone, all the countries experience a statistically significant 
decrease in exchange rate volatility after the Euro's launch. However, the situation is different in 
non-eurozone countries, as Norway and Poland suffered a statistically significant increase in 
exchange rate volatility while the other four countries did not. Outside of Europe, Japan is the one 
                                                 
12 We follow the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research to define the 
December 2007 as the end (the peak) of the expansion that began in November 2001.We divide subsample periods 
using US subprime crisis date instead of eurozone debt-crisis date in part of that US crisis induced a global economic 
crisis and in part of that eurozone debt-crisis started in late 2009 giving us too less observations for the crisis period 
analysis. 
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experiencing a decreased exchange rate volatility of local currency after 1999 while the United 
States does not.  
Overall, these findings on stock and foreign exchange rate markets volatilities offer preliminary 
evidence that, despite the euro bringing in exchange rate stabilization consistently across eurozone 
countries, it did not make stock returns of eurozone nonfinancial firms less volatile in most of the 
eurozone countries. Additionally, the financial crisis of 2008 increases the volatility of both stock 
market and foreign exchange market significantly worldwide. Both the eurozone and non-
eurozone Europe have a significant increase at 1% level in stock market volatility compared to the 
post-euro period. The standard deviation of eurozone market indices has raised 33.08%, and this 
number goes up to 35.51% when non-eurozone markets are included into the index.13  
 
1.4 Firm-level market risk and exchange rate risk exposure  
 First stage estimates across subsamples 
Following equation (1), we perform the first stage equation-by-equation OLS regressions to 
examine the euro's impact on firm-level stock risk and exchange rate exposure. Main results of 
median and mean values of market beta and exchange rate exposure coefficients (delta) are 
reported by area in Table 1.4-1.6, as well as corresponding p-values, number of positive/negative 
exchange exposure coefficients, and percentage of significant (at 5% level or better) exchange 
exposure coefficients.  
We begin our analysis by comparing the market beta of MNCs and non-MNCs. The beta is a 
measure of a stock’s price volatility in relation to the rest of the market. In general, in Table 1.4-
                                                 
13 Among the 19 test sample countries, Germany, Poland, and Sweden are three exceptions that their stock market 
volatility do not change significantly before and after the crisis of 2008. Finland and Luxemburg even surprisingly 
have a significantly lower volatile during 2008-2011 compared to 1999-2007. However, it is not lower than the volatile 
in the pre-euro period. F-test results for change caused by the crisis of 2008 are available on request. 
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1.6, MNCs have bigger market beta than non-MNCs across all three different periods of 
subsamples. Take the eurozone test sample as an example, MNCs have an average market beta of 
0.735 over the full period of 1993M1-2011M12, which is around 1.5 times higher than 0.262 of 
non-MNCs. This finding is consistent with the expectation that stock prices of small firms with no 
foreign sales face less market system risk. Besides, the difference between the beta of MNCs and 
non-MNCs is biggest in the eurozone and smallest in the outside of Europe. This is probably 
because that the market capitalization proportion of non-MNCs to MNCs is smallest in the 
eurozone test sample (2.0%) and largest in the outside of Europe test sample (11.8%), i.e. the 
difference of the market capitalization of non-MNCs and MNCs is smallest in the eurozone test 
sample and largest in the outside of Europe test sample. 
In the class of MNCs samples, the median values of market beta are 0.814, 0.630, and 0.922 
for the pre-euro period, post-euro period, and crisis period in the eurozone area, respectively. The 
market risk experienced a decrease after the introduction of the euro, but this decrease is not stable. 
It goes back quickly to a level as high as it was in the pre-euro period during 2008-2011. This 
surprising phenomenon consistently exists outside of Europe. The median values of market beta 
for outside of Europe are 0.930, 0.899, and 1.432.14 In the class of non-MNCs samples, this 
surprising phenomenon exists as well across all the regions. For instance, the median market beta 
of non-MNCs is 0.277, 0.140, and 0.236 for the pre-euro period, post-euro period, and crisis period 
in the eurozone; 0.453, 0.452, and 0.600 in the non-eurozone Europe; and 0.948, 0.647, and 0.660 
                                                 
14 The appearance of beta larger than 1 happens only in MNCs test sample of non-eurozone and outside Europe area 
during 2008-2011.It likely stems from the small number of large capitalization stocks in the market indices sample 
and the use of a market-cap-weighted local market index in the regression. When we use local market index of big 
companies (e.g. NASA100) instead of total local market index (TOTMKUS), or add an additional market index (e.g. 
world market index), or pool MNCs and non-MNCs samples together, this beta larger than 1 phenomenon disappears. 
Results are available up on request. 
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in the outside of Europe.15 The only exception exists in non-eurozone MNCs test sample. Its 
market beta moves up gradually without any significant downs or ups until 2011. 
Comparing the pre-euro period to the post-euro period, median beta has a 22.6% (eurozone) 
and 3.33% (outside Europe) decrease for MNCs respectively, while a 49.5% (eurozone Europe) 
and 31.8% (outside) decrease for non-MNCs respectively. The non-financial firms in the eurozone 
experience an obvious larger decrease of market risk compared to other areas, and non-MNCs 
experience an obvious larger decrease of market risk compared to MNCs. During the crisis period, 
the eurozone firms that once had the largest decrease in post-euro period also experience a 
comparatively large increase in market risk for both MNCs (46.3%) and non-MNCs (68.8%).  
After controlling for the general market risk, exchange rate exposures are reflected in 
coefficient delta. Usually, a firm's stock return can be affected by unexpected exchange rate 
movements through a variety of channels: (1) a firm may produce at home for exports, (2) a firm 
may produce at home with imports, and (3) a firm may produce for foreign sales abroad. According 
to the definition of multinationals, a MNC's stock return must be affected by exchange rate 
movements via channel (3), but it can also be affected by channel (1) and/or (2) if it has export 
sales and/or import purchases at the same time. For example, a depreciation of the home currency 
should increase firm value via foreign sales (making revenue increase in terms of home currency) 
and via export sales (making exports more competitive), while firm value can be reduced via 
imports (making imported raw/intermediate material cost higher in home currency). When a firm 
has exports, imports, and foreign sales at the same time, the sign of exposure coefficient is 
determined by the net effect of all three effects. Given that exposures to foreign exchange rate risk 
                                                 
15 Bartram and Karolyi (2006) provide the similar evidence that multinationals which have foreign Europe sales 
experience a decrease in market beta after the introduction of the Euro, but their sample period stops in August 2001, 
so no evidences of a later rise in market beta are provided in their paper. 
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have different signs, we follow Bartram and Karolyi (2006) in reporting the exposure coefficient 
(delta) with the positive and negative signs separately.16 For the same firm, it may have a positive 
exchange exposure coefficient this year but a negative exchange exposure next year. Hence, we 
see the number of firms with positive/negative exchange exposure coefficients varies across sub-
periods.  
In Table 1.4-1.6, the positive delta which may represent the MNCs having an import effect 
larger than the sum effect of foreign sales and exports is getting larger by time across areas.17 The 
median delta of MNCs between the pre- and post-euro period increases 47.3% outside of Europe, 
21.4% in non-eurozone Europe, but only 18.1% in eurozone. However, when we compare the 
increases between the post-euro and crisis period across areas, the median delta of MNCs has the 
largest increase (50.3%) in eurozone, while only 29.6% and 26.9% increase in non-eurozone 
Europe and outside of Europe, respectively.  
In contrast to the positive delta, the negative delta may represent the MNCs which have the sum 
effect of foreign sales and exports larger than the import effect. An increase in the negative delta 
means a decrease in the absolute value of negative delta, i.e. less exposure to the exchange rate 
risk. Although the eurozone MNCs are not the ones having the largest decrease in the absolute 
value of exchange rate risk exposure between the pre- and post-euro period, they have a second 
large decrease (18.3%) which is much higher than the MNCs of the non-eurozone Europe (2.1%).18 
But, like the positive delta in Table 1.4-1.6, the negative delta of MNCs in the eurozone has the 
largest increase in the absolute value of exchange rate risk exposure among the three areas during 
                                                 
16 Dominguez and Tesar (2006) and Hutson and O'Driscoll (2010) use the absolute value of the exposure 
coefficients since both of them have a mixed sample of MNCs and non-MNCs and they don't give a further analysis 
on different exchange exposure channels in MNCs. 
17 Recall that we use the nominal effective exchange rate, so an increase in exchange rate represents the home currency 
appreciation. 
18 MNCs in the outside of Europe have the largest decrease (30.6%) in the absolute value of exchange rate risk 
exposure. 
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the crisis period. The exchange rate risk exposure in absolute value increases 55.6% in the 
eurozone compared to the post-euro period, while only 11.6% in the outside of Europe. 19 
Furthermore, the eurozone MNCs have an average larger proportion of statistically significant 
positive (11.5%) and negative (13.3%) exchange exposures in the crisis period not only compared 
to the pre- and post-euro period, but also compared to non-eurozone MNCs and outside of Europe 
MNCs in the same crisis period.20 
Overall, whether MNCs have dominant import effect or dominant export and foreign sale effect, 
relative to other areas, eurozone MNCs perform better (experience less increase in exchange rate 
risk exposure) after the Euro's adoption, but worse (experience a larger increase in exchange rate 
risk exposure) during the crisis period. Additionally, non-MNCs have generally higher exchange 
rate risk exposures than MNCs, i.e. the firm value of non-MNCs is more likely to be affected by 
unexpected exchange rate movements. This may due to those non-MNCs being affected by the 
unexpected exchange rate movements indirectly, and thus don't have an effective way to measure 
and hedge this risk. However, the proportions of statistically significant exposures of non-MNCs 
are not necessarily bigger than the MNCs. 
 
 First stage estimates in dynamics  
Although Table 1.4-1.6 provides a lot of valuable information, there are still some important 
questions that have not been answered. For example, from our previous analysis, we find that the 
market risk first goes down in the post-euro period and then goes up in the crisis period. However, 
when did the market risk reach the bottom and then returned to the peak? Is the introduction of the 
                                                 
19 For non-eurozone Europe, surprisingly, the exchange risk exposure in absolute value even does not increase but 
continue to decrease in the crisis period. 
20 In the non-eurozone and outside of Europe, we don't find that exchange rate risk exposures are larger in the crisis 
period than in the pre-crisis period. 
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euro right the reason for this down trend? Moreover, were the market risk and exchanger rate risk 
exposures kept at a low and stable level until the crisis of 2007/2008? In order to gain a full picture 
of the movements of market risk and exchange rate exposures over 1993-2011, we employ the 
OLS rolling regression and recursive regression respectively.  
An OLS rolling regression makes it possible for us to check for changes in the regression 
coefficients over time. Here, we run an OLS regression, with the specification in equation (1), over 
a rolling window of 36 observations (i.e. with fixed 36 months).21 As a new observation becomes 
available, the previous initial observation is dropped from the regression equation. Eventually, this 
yields a vector of estimated coefficients possibly changing over time. In our study, we have 193 
windows (and therefore 193 estimated vectors) for each firm and 351067 windows for the full 
sample.22  
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 show the first stage rolling estimates of market beta and exchange rate risk 
exposure delta over the ending dates by regions, respectively. The estimated beta or delta at t is 
based on data from t-36 to t, a window of three years. In Figure 1.1, the trend of market beta is 
consistent with our previous findings from Table 1.4-1.6. For MNCs in the eurozone in panel A, 
the market beta first went down from around 0.9 in the beginning of 1996 to around 0.4 in the late 
2001. The market betas for late 2001 are the estimates based on data from late 1998 to late 2001. 
In late 2009, it rose gradually to peak at around 1 and slid down slowly again since then. For non-
MNCs in the eurozone, the market beta has a similar moving trend (at a lower level) but with a 
comparatively flat section between the late 2001 and late 2005. This scenario is repeated outside 
                                                 
21 The choice of 36 months was guided by the need to have enough rolling estimates before 1999 to assess Euro's 
introduction effect. Most of the results have been replicated with rolling window of 48 and 60 months with no 
noticeable changes. 
22 The advantage of rolling regression is its simplicity. However, it has the disadvantage of losing the estimation of 
the coefficients for the first n observations (with n = 36 months in our specification). This hampers the possibility to 
assess how the market beta and exchange rate risk exposure changed in the period 1993M1-1995M12. 
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of Europe with just a few slight changes. For MNCs, the market beta first went down to touch its 
bottom around late 2001, but rose to the peak around 2006/2007, earlier than the eurozone area. 
Furthermore, another trough appears around the middle of 2008. These findings seem to be in line 
with the fact that the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis has taken place a couple of years earlier than 
the Eurozone debt-crisis.  
Panel B of Figure 1.1 presents a continuously and gradual up trend for both MNCs betas and 
non-MNCs betas just like the indication of Table 1.4-1.6. This inconsistent phenomenon by 
regions raises a question: is the trough in the beta trend of eurozone and outside of Europe around 
euro's launch really caused by the euro's launch? If so, then why does the outside of Europe have 
a similar visible trough as the eurozone, but non-eurozone Europe does not? We will revisit this 
question in the section of robust checks.23  
In Figure 1.2 of rolling estimates for exchange rate risk exposure, consistent evidence is shown 
in Table 1.4-1.6 that, compared to non-eurozone Europe and outside of Europe MNCs, eurozone 
MNCs experience a smaller increase in positive exposure and even a decrease in the absolute value 
of negative exposure between 1999 and 2007, but experience a larger increase in positive exposure 
and a larger decrease in negative exposure between 2008 and 2011. The movements of exchange 
rate exposure for non-MNCs seem to not follow any rules across areas.24 
Altogether, all of this evidence indicates that a stock market risk trough coincided with the 
introduction of the euro in not only the eurozone but also other areas, while the eurozone had the 
                                                 
23 Bartram and Karolyi (2006) find the smallest decrease of beta (-0.115) for the non-eurozone Europe MNCs after 
the introduction of the euro, but a much larger one for the eurozone (-0.208) and outside of Europe MNCs (-0.359). 
They have a longer period before 1999 and much shorter period after 1999. The different length of test sample periods 
could be the reason for Bartram and Karolyi's finding of a decreasing beta and our finding of an increasing beta. 
24 Recursive rolling regressions are also done for three regions and provide consistent results to the rolling regressions. 
The estimates of recursive regression at time t incorporate all the information from the beginning of the sample, up to 
time t. The results set off the disadvantage that an observation receiving full weight for estimating in one period is 
relegated to having a weight of zero in the next. Figures of recursive regressions are available up on request. 
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largest decrease and the lowest bottom. However, this low stock market risk phenomenon lasted 
only temporarily around 1999-2002. Since then, market beta rose back to its former level gradually 
before the crisis of 2008, and shot up to an even higher number in the crisis period. With respect 
to exchange rate risk exposure, firms in the eurozone experienced a smaller exposure after the 
introduction of the euro relative to the crisis period, while firms in other areas experienced the 
opposite: a larger exposure after the introduction of the euro relative to the crisis period. 
 
1.5 Explaining Firm-level Market Risk and Exchange Rate Risk Exposure 
In this section, we attempt to find the determinants of firm-level market risk and exchange rate 
risk exposure by running a second stage regression. We take the estimated coefficients from 
equation (1) and regress these on a variety of potential explanatory variables. 
0 1
ˆ
ij ij ijV
                                 (2a) 
0 1
ˆ
ij ij ijV
                                  (2b) 
ˆ
ij  and 
ˆ
ij  are the estimated beta or delta from the first stage regression of equation (1), and ijV  is 
the potential static or dynamic explanatory variables. 
 
 Firm size and industry affiliation 
Firm size is a very common explanatory variable for market beta and the exchange rate risk 
exposure. Our prior about the relationship between firm size and exposure is ambiguous as 
Dominguez and Tesar (2006) stated: "on the one hand, large firms may be more likely to be 
engaged in international activities, and therefore more likely to be affected by the exchange rate 
movements; on the other hand, larger firms may be more likely to hedge exchange rate risk, so 
that smaller firms may be more likely to be exposed". The results of Dominguez and Tesar (2006) 
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and Hutson and Stevenson (2010) show that this relationship may be nonlinear. In our study, we 
examine this relationship in two ways. One way, we regress the ˆij  and 
ˆ
ij  from equation (1) on 
the market capitalization directly. The other way, we use a one-zero size dummy as our explanatory 
variable. One is for the large-sized (top half) firms according to the firm-level market capitalization. 
We notice that using a size dummy explanatory variable is more likely to bring us a significant 
coefficient of firm size to both market beta and the exposure reflector delta.25 This indicates that 
the relationship between market beta (exposure delta) and the firm size may be nonlinear. 
To further test the preliminary nonlinearity, we introduce an interaction model: 
0 1 2 50
ˆ ( )ij ij ij ij ijV D V V
                     (3a) 
0 1 2 50
ˆ ( )ij ij ij ij ijV D V V
                      (3b) 
The estimated beta and delta are obtained from the first stage regression. Vij is the market 
capitalization and V50 is the median of Vij. We set 1ijD   if 50ijV V  . If 2 0   and 2 1   can be 
obtained from the same estimation equation, we can confirm that the relationship between firm 
size and exposure is a kind of nonlinear.  Table 1.4-1.6 presents the results of both 
 and  . In 
Panel A, B and C, gamma 1 and gamma 2 have close absolute values but opposite signs in full 
sample period as well as three sub periods. It implies that, for those firms having a less-than-
median market capitalization size, both market and exchange exposures are getting larger along 
with the firm size at a relatively quick speed (steeper slope). However, for those firms having a 
larger-than-median market capitalization size, both market and exchange exposures are getting 
larger along with the firm size at a very slow speed (close-to-flat slope or even slightly negative 
                                                 
25 These results are available upon request. We also examined by (1) using separate dummies for three tiers (top-third, 
medium-third, and small-third) as Dominguez and Tesar (2006) did, and (2) using a different cutline for size dummy, 
such as €150 million used in Hutson and O'Driscoll (2010). Results are not much improved. 
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slope). This may due to that the relationship between hedging ability and firm size is nonlinear. 
The difference of hedging ability between large firms could be very small while between medium 
to small firms could be fairly large. In addition, according to our results in Table 1.7, the coefficient 
of firm size varies across different periods. The significance of results could also largely depend 
on which area and what trigger value26 is examined.  
Industry affiliation is another aspect to explain the exchange rate risk exposure. On the one side, 
some industries may be more likely to have international transactions while others may not. On 
the other side, the levels of competitive among industries could be different and thus generate 
different levels of exposure.27 Our 10 industry categories are formed on the basis of four-digit SIC 
codes. Signs on the industry dummies are not consistent across areas. The industries that are 
commonly exposed are high-technology manufacturing, wholesale trade, and hotel and business 
services.  
 
 Other time-varying explanatory variables  
Besides firm size and industry affiliation, the existing literatures also find some other firm-level 
factors may affect the exchange rate risk exposure, such as foreign sales, foreign assets, leverage, 
etc. One thing need to be noticed is that we have a long sample period (19 years) and these variables 
may vary largely over time. In order to catch the possible variability, we examine this relationship 
in a dynamic context. We use the rolling estimated beta (delta) as the dependent variable and use 
the rolling mean of foreign sales (foreign assets, etc.) as the independent variable. Take the 
                                                 
26 In the report of Table 4, V50 is used as a trigger value.  
27 Marston (2001), Allayannis and Ihrig (2001) and Bodnar et al. (2002) explicitly modeled some indirect effect, mark-
ups and pass-through in trade respectively, generated through industry competition. They find that “firms in some 
industries may be able to pass on to their customers increased costs or prices that results from exchange rate 
movements, while others will have less flexibility to do so. The more competitive the industry and the less 
differentiated the product, the greater the exchange exposure”. 
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Eurozone MNCs test sample as an example, we get one estimated beta (delta) observation and one 
mean observation of foreign sales (foreign assets, etc.) from one multinational firm at one end-
time point of the rolling regression. Over the entire sample period of 1993-2011, we have totally 
193 such rolling end-time points. At each rolling end-time point, we have 161 MNCs. Therefore, 
we have 161 estimated delta observations and 161 mean observations of foreign sales to run the 
second stage regression at one end-time point. Finally, we get 193 estimated coefficients (gamma) 
on foreign sales (foreign assets, etc.) over the entire sample period. 
Figure 1.3 presents the rolling relationship between market beta and five explanatory variables: 
Europe sales, foreign sales, foreign assets, foreign income, and total debt, respectively. Although 
all five rolling relationships vary over time, most of the time, they are positive. It indicates that the 
more foreign sales (foreign assets, etc.) a multinational firm has, the higher stock market risk it is 
exposed to. The second stage rolling relationship of exchange rate risk exposure is presented in 
Figure 1.4. All five rolling relationships vary over time around zero within the range of -0.05 to 
0.05. For the positive-exposure firms, Europe sales have 14% statistically significant results over 
the full period, while other explanatory variables only have 6 to 8% (significant at 5% level). For 
the negative-exposure firms, the debt ratio has 17% statistically significant results over the full 
period, while other explanatory variables only have 6 to 8% (significant at 5% level). Within the 
significant results, foreign sales and foreign income have a positive impact on the exposure at most 
of the time. Foreign assets and debt ratio, however, have a negative impact at most of the time.   
 
1.6 Robustness Checks 
We also investigate several factors that may influence the robustness of our regression results. 
First, any crisis that occurred near the date of the Euro's launch may influence market beta and the 
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exchange rate risk exposure as well. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 caused a loss of 
confidence by domestic and foreign investors in all emerging markets. It led to a fall in capital 
inflows and an increase in capital outflows that triggered a very large nominal depreciation and a 
stock market crash, not only in Asia but also outside of Asia due to financial contagion.28  Hong 
Kong's Hang Seng Index, Japan's Nikkei 225, London's FTSE 100 Index, Frankfurt's DAX index, 
and New York's Dow Jones all sank at that time. Bartram and Karolyi (2006) argue that market 
participants anticipated the introduction of the euro, so that its effect should be reflected in stock 
prices already in 1998. If so, it's very difficult to distinguish the impact of the Euro's launch from 
the impact of Asian financial crisis. Unfortunately, we are not able to run a robust test on this. 
Second, the burst of the information technology bubble (also referred to as the Internet bubble 
and the dot-com boom) caused the American recession in 2001. From early 1998 through February 
2000, there is a huge rise, persistence, and then subsequent fall of Internet stock prices.29 The 
period of this Internet bubble overlaps the euro's launch date, and it potentially drive up the market 
beta during 1998-2000. If this is true, then the impact of euro's launch is underestimated in our 
study. We exclude all the firms in Telecom, Media, and Technology/Internet (TMT) sectors from 
our test sample based on industry sector information categorized by First Research and Datastream 
SIC codes.30 We repeat all the rolling regressions in three areas and find that if we include the 
firms in TMT sector in the test sample, then the market beta is raised by around 13% in eurozone 
countries, around 14% in non-eurozone Europe countries, and around 20% in outside-of-Europe 
countries during 1998-2000.31 This difference is more apparent in MNCs than in non-MNCs, and 
                                                 
28 See Johnson et al. (2000) for explanation of Asian financial crisis and more references. 
29 See Ofek and Richardson (2003) for more references. 
30 6.2% of MNCs and 5.7% of non-MNCs are deleted from eurozone samples, 12.2% and 6.9% from non-eurozone 
Europe samples, and 19.9% and 5.8% from outside Europe samples. 
31 It is reflected in the gap of rolling graph lines between "Beta" and "Beta (no TMT sectors)" during 2001-2003 in 
Figure 1.5. 
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may indicate that Internet bubble exists more possibly in MNCs rather than non-MNCs. However, 
excluding the firms in TMT sectors does not change any of our major conclusions. Figure 1.5 and 
1.6 present the market beta and exchange exposure delta results based on the data of firms not in 
TMT sectors. 
Third, the value of the euro plummeted immediately after its launch and continued to be a weak 
currency throughout 2000 and 2001. In 2002, the value of the euro finally began to rise rapidly. 
This hurt firms based in Europe but generated profits abroad (especially in the Americas) due to 
an unfavorable exchange rate. France and Germany both entered recessions towards the end of 
2001, but each of their recessions had ended after a mere six months. United Kingdom, which is 
an EU member but not a eurozone country, managed to avoid sliding into recession during this 
period. In our non-eurozone Europe test sample, UK firms account for 57.1% of total MNCs and 
55.6% of total non-MNCs. This explains why we didn't see a recession trough (i.e. the "V" 
phenomenon) in our non-eurozone Europe sample results. 
Fourth, we clean out the export effect on the exchange rate risk exposure. In section 1.4.2, we 
discussed that unexpected exchange rate movements could affect the stock price directly through 
three channels: export, import, and foreign sales. Excluding the firms that have exports in any year 
from 1993-2011, the export effect on the exchange rate risk exposure can be deleted.32 The rolling 
lines of beta and delta with "no exporter" behind in Figure 1.5 and 1.6 present the net effect of the 
import effect and the foreign sales effect. Our results are robust regardless of the export effect on 
market beta and the exchange rate risk exposure.33 
                                                 
32 16.1% of MNCs and 23.2% of non-MNCs are deleted from the eurozone samples, 24.5% and 31.3% from the non-
eurozone Europe samples, and 51.8% and 18.7% from the outside of Europe samples. 
33 Bodnar and Marston (2002) established an exchange rate exposure model to capture different forms of exchange 
rate risk exposure. According to their model, a pure multinational firm that has a foreign to total sales ratio at 50% 
should have a delta of 0.5, i.e. -0.5 in the context of this paper. The shortage of firm-level import data prevents us to 
give a further empirical analysis on this. 
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Fifth, we examine the robustness of our regression results on a much broader test sample. From 
the raw data sample of 31,323 non-financial firms, 6,574 firms that have public trading records at 
least four years before and four years after the euro's launch to constitute our broad data sample 
are selected. This selection balances the trade-off between keeping a large number of firms and 
keeping each firm with enough time-series observations. Our sample of 876 non-financial firms 
(including both MNCs and non-MNCs) from the eurozone, 746 from the non-eurozone Europe, 
and 4,952 from outside of Europe, are regressed by regions using both equation-by-equation OLS 
(including rolling regression) and panel data OLS (including rolling regression). The results and 
inferences are largely robust to this alternative broad test sample. Because the broad test samples 
are very balanced in regard to industry affiliations, this examination addresses the concern about 
the sensitivity of our results to the industry classification simultaneously.  
 
1.7 Conclusions 
Our study investigates the effect of the Euro's launch as a common currency on 6,574 firms in 
nineteen countries. It evaluates the hypothesis that a common currency leads to lower foreign 
exchange rate risk and, thus, lower foreign exchange rate exposures of nonfinancial firms. Our 
first important result is that the introduction of the Euro leads to lower market risk exposures for 
multinational firms in and outside of Europe. However, this low stock market risk phenomenon 
has a sign of lasting only temporarily. Before the crisis of 2008, market betas had risen back to its 
former level gradually. It's difficult to judge that the rising back is because that the Euro's launch 
effect is temporary or is driven by the potential coming crisis. During the financial crisis period, 
market betas shot up to an even higher level.  
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Our second important result is with respect to exchange rate risk exposure. Firms in the 
eurozone experience a smaller exposure in the post-euro period relative to the crisis period, while 
firms in other areas experience the opposite: a larger exposure in the post-euro period relative to 
the crisis period. The empirical results have important policy implications as they demonstrate that 
the benefits of currency stabilization for nonfinancial companies only exist in the short run. Also 
these benefits could turn out to be damaging during the financial crisis period. 
The third important result comes from the second stage regression that regressing the estimated 
exposures on a variety of potential explanatory variables. We find that it is difficult to identify the 
determinants of the exposure, because the relationship between the exposure and its determinants 
varies over time and also differs across firm classifications. A firm's size may not have a linear 
relationship with the exchange rate exposure. A large scale multinational firm, which is expected 
to be exposed more to exchange rate risk, may have a low exchange rate exposure because of its 
hedging activities. Hedging activities are not all linear and the exchange rate risks cannot always 
be finely hedged.  
Ours is the most comprehensive firm-level analysis of foreign exchange exposures to date, 
covering both multinational and non-multinational firms in three regions----the eurozone, Noneuro 
Europe and outside of Europe----for the pre-euro, post-euro-and-pre-crisis and crisis periods. It 
capitalizes on an interesting and important experiment in the introduction of the Euro. We, 
however, acknowledge several aspects of this study that could be improved. For example, our 
study sets the crisis period between 2008 and 2011 according to the US financial crisis starting 
date instead of the Euro crisis starting date. If enough data are available after the late 2009, we 
could try to set the crisis period differently and get better evidence on firm-level exchange 
exposure in the Euro's crisis. Furthermore, the exclusion of Asian market firms (only Japan is 
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included) could affect the appropriateness of our benchmarking of affected firms. However, our 
event-study approach limits our ability to make any improvement since the data of Asian firms in 
the pre-euro period are rarely available. Finally, as described earlier in the paper, to some extent, 
we could say that the level of exchange rate exposure of a firm depends on the success of its 
hedging activity, what hedging strategies they use, and if those hedging strategies are efficient. 
Meanwhile, the financial market development of a country is another important factor behind that 
will influence a firm’s hedging strategy decision, strategy efficiency, and hedging opportunities, 
and thus impact the exchange rate exposure eventually. However, firm-level data on hedging 
activity is limited for most countries, therefore hindering further explanation on exchange rate 
exposure puzzle from the hedging aspect. 
  
 
 
2
5
 
Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Firms in Samples 
This table reports statistics on the test sample of MNCs and Non-MNCs by area. N is the number of firms. Market capitalization, total assets, and sales are in 
million Euros. Foreign sales and foreign Europe sales are percentage of total sales. Q1, Q2, and Q3 refer to the 25% quartile, 50% quartile, and 75% quartile 
respectively.
  Market 
capitalization 
Total assets Sales Foreign sales 
(%) 
Foreign Europe 
sales (%) 
 N Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 
Eurozone 
MNCs 161 237.5 1248.3 5617.7 422.1 1597.2 7145.9 538.4 1712.4 7463.5 52.0 63.0 73.7 27.4 36.0 44.7 
Non-MNCs 194 10.6 25.3 93.1 16.2 46.0 164.8 10.3 38.1 109.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
                 
Non-Eurozone 
Europe 
                
MNCs 147 229.2 861.1 3057.9 258.8 881.1 3200.6 282.0 867.3 4356.5 52.6 62.8 76.5 24.6 36.0 47.2 
Non-MNCs 160 18.1 42.5 147.0 25.7 64.9 192.5 17.8 68.1 233.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
                 
Outside 
Europe 
                
MNCs 141 485.9 1536.0 6650.8 411.8 1363.1 5226.2 361.4 1141.0 4525.7 30.6 40.6 53.2 15.9 21.4 28.2 
Non-MNCs 1014 76.6 180.7 591.6 159.4 371.8 1085.9 153.6 383.5 1112.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
                 
All Firms                 
MNCs 449 296.1 1225.6 5134.4 314.2 1198.8 4950.4 353.1 1170.9 4852.3 40.7 56.0 69.4 21.1 30.6 42.8 
Non-MNCs 1368 47.6 131.8 451.6 87.5 264.5 773.9 81.0 258.9 821.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Table 1.2 Statistics Summary of Stock Market Indices Return 
This table summarizes statistics for the stock market indices return. The means and standard deviations of market 
indices return is presented in three different subsample periods as well as in the full sample period. The test for change 
is based on the null hypothesis that the variance of market indices return does not change significantly before (1993-
1998) and after (1999-2007) the Euro's launch. The F-statistic is the ratio of the larger variance to the smaller variance. 
The reported p-values are the corresponding two-sided significance levels of the F-test.  
 Market Indices Return  
 93M1-98M12 99M1-07M12 08M1-11M12 93M1-11M12 Test for change 
Country Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F-
test 
p-value 
AUT 0.673 4.741 1.279 3.730 -0.913 8.460 0.626 5.396 1.616 0.0122 
BEL 1.942 4.150 0.514 4.150 -0.393 6.812 0.774 4.886 1.000 0.4940 
DEU 1.633 4.808 0.662 5.666 -0.441 6.255 0.737 5.569 1.389 0.0696 
ESP 2.476 6.050 0.787 4.711 -0.680 6.529 1.012 5.661 1.649 0.0095 
FIN 3.443 7.458 1.311 9.250 -1.065 7.445 1.484 8.474 1.538 0.0266 
FRA 1.589 5.340 0.831 4.961 -0.553 6.194 0.779 5.390 1.159 0.2433 
IRL 2.480 4.841 0.548 5.052 -1.216 8.059 0.787 5.882 1.089 0.3532 
ITA 2.017 7.432 0.569 4.969 -1.062 6.943 0.683 6.333 2.237 0.0001 
LUX 2.169 4.551 0.756 6.333 0.429 4.832 1.133 5.544 1.937 0.0016 
NLD 2.113 4.647 0.518 4.889 -0.590 7.537 0.789 5.547 1.107 0.3257 
PRT 2.155 6.041 0.617 4.344 -1.130 6.250 0.735 5.457 1.933 0.0010 
EUROZONE 1.807 4.290 0.651 4.405 -0.477 5.862 0.779 4.769 1.054 0.3985 
           
CHE 1.952 5.111 0.489 3.851 -0.382 4.490 0.768 4.483 1.762 0.0039 
DNK 1.707 4.778 1.076 4.845 -0.186 6.959 1.010 5.357 1.028 0.4550 
GBR 1.390 3.593 0.525 3.788 0.145 5.569 0.718 4.178 1.112 0.3184 
NOR 1.599 5.910 1.485 5.391 -0.154 8.059 1.176 6.209 1.202 0.1932 
POL 0.952 13.194 1.438 7.405 -0.423 7.351 0.889 9.284 3.175 0.0000 
SWE 2.379 6.019 0.955 6.537 0.254 6.654 1.257 6.426 1.180 0.2291 
EUROPE 1.823 4.257 0.695 4.297 -0.423 5.823 0.816 4.707 1.019 0.4596 
           
JPN 0.076 5.468 0.497 4.633 -1.060 6.001 0.037 5.223 1.393 0.0599 
USA 1.769 3.770 0.409 4.107 0.063 6.002 0.766 4.510 1.186 0.2213 
WORLD 1.456 4.483 0.566 4.436 -0.034 5.060 0.721 4.611 1.021 0.4560 
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Table 1.3 Statistics Summary of Exchange Rate Change 
Exchange Rate Volatility 
 93M1-98M12 99M1-07M12 08M1-11M12 93M1-11M12 Test for change 
Country Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F-test p-value 
AUT 0.011 0.628 0.014 0.451 -0.044 0.636 0.001 0.551 1.939 0.0009 
BEL -0.022 0.829 0.036 0.653 -0.035 0.934 0.003 0.773 1.612 0.0127 
DEU 0.041 0.930 0.052 0.785 -0.073 1.035 0.022 0.886 1.404 0.0567 
ESP -0.240 1.129 0.026 0.482 -0.030 0.727 -0.070 0.795 5.486 0.0000 
FIN 0.179 1.532 0.046 0.781 -0.064 1.076 0.065 1.127 3.848 0.0000 
FRA 0.029 0.800 0.035 0.649 -0.059 0.849 0.014 0.741 1.519 0.0248 
IRL -0.121 1.299 0.065 1.034 -0.096 1.373 -0.028 1.196 1.578 0.0160 
ITA -0.080 1.831 0.074 0.699 -0.050 0.857 -0.001 1.199 6.862 0.0000 
LUX -0.043 0.502 0.022 0.432 -0.023 0.741 -0.008 0.530 1.350 0.0791 
NLD -0.016 0.791 0.035 0.685 -0.042 0.879 0.002 0.760 1.333 0.0890 
PRT -0.139 0.956 0.021 0.404 -0.028 0.542 -0.040 0.655 5.600 0.0000 
           
CHE 0.138 1.366 -0.001 0.863 0.584 2.290 0.166 1.439 2.505 0.0000 
DNK 0.038 0.873 0.019 0.618 -0.045 0.824 0.012 0.748 1.995 0.0006 
GBR 0.189 1.505 0.023 1.109 -0.416 2.194 -0.017 1.527 1.842 0.0021 
NOR -0.097 1.121 0.132 1.375 0.004 1.780 0.033 1.397 1.505 0.0330 
POL -0.905 1.478 0.164 2.243 -0.420 2.922 -0.296 2.246 2.303 0.0001 
SWE -0.149 1.640 0.032 1.226 0.060 1.848 -0.019 1.505 1.789 0.0031 
           
JPN 0.413 2.956 -0.044 2.021 0.797 2.790 0.278 2.526 2.139 0.0002 
USA 0.378 1.234 -0.144 1.094 0.032 1.882 0.058 1.351 1.272 0.1294 
This table summarizes statistics for the exchange rate change. The means and standard deviations of percentage change 
in exchange rate are presented in three different subsample periods as well as in the full sample period. The test for 
change is based on the null hypothesis that the variance of exchange rate percentage change does not change 
significantly before (1993-1998) and after (1999-2007) the Euro's launch. The F-statistic is the ratio of the larger 
variance to the smaller variance. The reported p-values are the corresponding two-sided significance levels of the F-
test.  
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Table 1.4 Stability of Firm-level Regression across Subsamples (Panel A) 
Panel A: Eurozone 
 MNCs Non-MNCs 
 
93M1-
98M12 
99M1-
07M12 
08M1-
11M12 
93M1- 
11M12 
93M1-
98M12 
99M1-
07M12 
08M1-
11M12 
93M1- 
11M12 
  
Median 0.814 0.630 0.922 0.735 0.277 0.140 0.236 0.262 
Mean 0.795 0.677 0.953 0.785 0.371 0.216 0.342 0.301 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 %sig. 87.6 76.4 86.3 95.0 27.8 21.1 26.3 43.3 
  
Median 0.540 0.638 0.959 0.514 0.625 0.983 1.286 0.522 
Mean 0.768 0.857 1.396 0.576 1.419 1.612 2.210 0.840 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
no. pos 65 69 78 75 79 85 91 90 
%sig.pos 10.8 2.9 11.5 5.3 3.8 2.4 6.6 5.6 
  
Median -0.857 -0.800 -1.245 -0.510 -0.996 -1.077 -1.263 -0.829 
Mean -1.002 -0.976 -2.080 -0.653 -1.542 -2.154 -2.822 -1.443 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
no. neg 96 92 83 86 115 109 99 104 
%sig.neg 10.4 4.3 13.3 9.3 5.2 4.6 9.1 11.5 
No. firms 161 161 161 161 194 194 190 194 
This table reports the market beta and exchange rate exposure (delta) results of firm-level regressions of MNCs and 
Non-MNCs across three different sub-samples as well as the full sample in eurozone. Positive and negative deltas are 
reported separately. All significance levels are set at 5% based on Newey-West corrected standard errors.  
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Table 1.5 Stability of Firm-level Regression across Subsamples (Panel B) 
Panel B: Non-Eurozone Europe 
 MNCs Non-MNCs 
 
93M1-
98M12 
99M1-
07M12 
08M1-
11M12 
93M1- 
11M12 
93M1-
98M12 
99M1-
07M12 
08M1-
11M12 
93M1- 
11M12 
  
Median 0.840 0.912 1.214 0.970 0.453 0.452 0.600 0.477 
Mean 0.829 1.013 1.246 1.005 0.440 0.542 0.663 0.569 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 %sig. 83.7 88.4 89.1 100.0 39.4 51.9 53.2 72.5 
  
Median 0.453 0.550 0.713 0.375 0.567 0.627 1.026 0.544 
Mean 0.695 0.645 1.001 0.460 0.845 0.848 1.306 0.705 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
no. pos 38 48 88 59 76 87 100 96 
%sig.pos 10.5 4.2 15.9 6.8 7.9 4.6 13.0 9.4 
  
Median -0.662 -0.648 -0.423 -0.291 -0.622 -0.512 -0.295 -0.349 
Mean -0.787 -0.832 -1.017 -0.402 -0.956 -0.908 -0.847 -0.517 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
no. neg 109 99 59 88 84 73 58 64 
%sig.neg 25.7 10.1 5.1 10.2 10.7 4.1 3.4 1.6 
No. firms 147 147 147 147 160 160 158 160 
This table reports the market beta and exchange rate exposure (delta) results of firm-level regressions of MNCs and 
Non-MNCs across three different sub-samples as well as the full sample in non-eurozone Europe. Positive and 
negative deltas are reported separately. All significance levels are set at 5% based on Newey-West corrected standard 
errors.   
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Table 1.6 Stability of Firm-level Regression across Subsamples (Panel C) 
Panel C: Outside of Europe 
 MNCs  Non-MNCs  
 
93M1-
98M12 
99M1-
07M12 
08M1-
11M12 
93M1- 
11M12 
93M1-
98M12 
99M1-
07M12 
08M1-
11M12 
93M1- 
11M12 
  
Median 0.930 0.899 1.432 1.051 0.948 0.647 0.660 0.793 
Mean 0.976 1.050 1.419 1.115 0.938 0.707 0.778 0.817 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 %sig. 83.7 78.7 92.1 98.6 85.9 74.1 60.7 94.7 
  
Median 0.351 0.517 0.656 0.313 0.403 0.317 0.449 0.211 
Mean 0.609 0.755 1.001 0.387 0.507 0.515 0.706 0.287 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
no. pos 36 59 71 29 753 377 485 578 
%sig.pos 5.6 5.1 2.8 0.0 8.6 4.0 7.4 6.1 
  
Median -0.745 -0.517 -0.577 -0.572 -0.208 -0.400 -0.576 -0.240 
Mean -1.107 -0.754 -0.845 -0.674 -0.445 -0.554 -0.905 -0.428 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
no. neg 105 82 69 112 260 636 529 436 
%sig.neg 18.1 6.1 8.7 20.5 3.1 7.2 7.8 5.7 
No. firms 141 141 140 141 1014 1014 1014 1014 
This table reports the market beta and exchange rate exposure (delta) results of firm-level regressions of MNCs and 
Non-MNCs across three different sub-samples as well as the full sample in outside of Europe. Positive and negative 
deltas are reported separately. All significance levels are set at 5% based on Newey-West corrected standard errors. 
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Table 1.7 Firm-level Exposure and Firm Size 
Panel A: Eurozone 
 MNCs  Non-MNCs 
 
1993m1-
1998m12 
1999m1-
2007m12 
2008m1-
2011m12 
1993m1-
2011m12 
 
1993m1-
1998m12 
1999m1-
2007m12 
2008m1-
2011m12 
1993m1-
2011m12 
1
  0.383 
(0.000) 
0.258 
(0.000) 
0.206 
(0.000) 
0.260 
(0.000) 
 
-6.118 
(0.287) 
5.284 
(0.143) 
5.470 
(0.175) 
10.549 
(0.000) 
2

 
-0.380 
(0.000) 
-0.257 
(0.000) 
-0.211 
(0.000) 
-0.260 
(0.000) 
 
6.181 
(0.283) 
-5.239 
(0.147) 
-5.486 
(0.174) 
-10.558 
(0.000) 
1
   0.236 
(0.000) 
0.310 
(0.002) 
0.347 
(0.000) 
0.304 
(0.000) 
 
-14.198 
(0.246) 
1.082 
(0.789) 
19.228 
(0.001) 
13.622 
(0.001) 
2
   -0.225 
(0.176) 
-0.307 
(0.003) 
-0.351 
(0.000) 
-0.302 
(0.000) 
 
14.239 
(0.245) 
-1.133 
(0.780) 
-19.263 
(0.001) 
-13.641 
(0.001) 
1
   0.437 
(0.000) 
0.257 
(0.001) 
0.085 
(0.245) 
0.245 
(0.000) 
 
-4.281 
(0.408) 
10.806 
(0.061) 
-6.845 
(0.203) 
7.977 
(0.026) 
2
   -0.435 
(0.000) 
-0.257 
(0.001) 
-0.090 
(0.225) 
-0.246 
(0.000) 
 
4.493 
(0.390) 
-10.727 
(0.063) 
6.853 
(0.203) 
-7.957 
(0.027) 
Panel B: Non-eurozone Europe 
 MNCs  Non-MNCs 
 
1993m1-
1998m12 
1999m1-
2007m12 
2008m1-
2011m12 
1993m1-
2011m12 
 
1993m1-
1998m12 
1999m1-
2007m12 
2008m1-
2011m12 
1993m1-
2011m12 
1
  0.663 
(0.000) 
0.131 
(0.264) 
0.049 
(0.643) 
0.160 
(0.064) 
 
10.965 
(0.003) 
1.751 
(0.439) 
4.884 
(0.075) 
4.022 
(0.069) 
2

 
-0.664 
(0.000) 
-0.133 
(0.257) 
-0.056 
(0.601) 
-0.163 
(0.060) 
 
-10.941 
(0.003) 
-1.733 
(0.445) 
-4.880 
(0.076) 
-3.975 
(0.073) 
1
   0.868 
(0.003) 
0.309 
(0.165) 
0.301 
(0.057) 
0.329 
(0.014) 
 
3.808 
(0.397) 
0.891 
(0.756) 
7.346 
(0.041) 
4.054 
(0.149) 
2
   -0.868 
(0.003) 
-0.318 
(0.158) 
-0.339 
(0.042) 
-0.335 
(0.013) 
 
-3.810 
(0.397) 
-0.848 
(0.769) 
-7.364 
(0.041) 
-4.047 
(0.151) 
1
   0.591 
(0.000) 
0.065 
(0.640) 
0.148 
(0.246) 
0.100 
(0.398) 
 
15.219 
(0.005) 
4.004 
(0.282) 
-1.202 
(0.788) 
4.441 
(0.189) 
2
   -0.591 
(0.000) 
-0.066 
(0.634) 
0.149 
(0.260) 
-0.102 
(0.391) 
 
-15.143 
(0.005) 
-3.996 
(0.284) 
1.235 
(0.783) 
-4.374 
(0.197) 
Panel C: Outside Europe 
 MNCs  Non-MNCs 
 
1993m1-
1998m12 
1999m1-
2007m12 
2008m1-
2011m12 
1993m1-
2011m12 
 
1993m1-
1998m12 
1999m1-
2007m12 
2008m1-
2011m12 
1993m1-
2011m12 
1
  0.140 
(0.244) 
0.059 
(0.507) 
-0.207 
(0.004) 
-0.021 
(0.733) 
 
0.145 
(0.491) 
-0.800 
(0.006) 
0.665 
(0.200) 
-0.347 
(0.128) 
2

 
-0.142 
(0.245) 
-0.062 
(0.491) 
0.201 
(0.007) 
0.018 
(0.778) 
 
-0.152 
(0.472) 
0.799 
(0.006) 
-0.666 
(0.200) 
0.344 
(0.133) 
1
   0.150 
(0.523) 
-0.025 
(0.897) 
-0.335 
(0.002) 
0.028 
(0.853) 
 
-0.084 
(0.730) 
-0.431 
(0.416) 
-2.074 
(0.026) 
-0.690 
(0.018) 
2
   -0.150 
(0.528) 
0.023 
(0.906) 
0.334 
(0.002) 
-0.026 
(0.861) 
 
0.077 
(0.753) 
0.431 
(0.417) 
2.074 
(0.027) 
0.687 
(0.019) 
1
   0.111 
(0.433) 
0.045 
(0.638) 
-0.020 
(0.825) 
-0.013 
(0.848) 
 
0.952 
(0.019) 
-1.060 
(0.002) 
1.330 
(0.045) 
0.044 
(0.905) 
2
   -0.112 
(0.432) 
-0.052 
(0.595) 
0.013 
(0.885) 
0.008 
(0.904) 
 
-0.963 
(0.019) 
1.051 
(0.002) 
-1.342 
(0.045) 
-0.064 
(0.864) 
This table reports the coefficients of firm size in the second stage regressions: 
0 1 2 50
ˆ ( )ij ij ij ij ijV D V V
             and
 
0 1 2 50
ˆ ( )ij ij ij ij ijV D V V
            , where Dij = 1 if 50ijV V  The estimated beta and delta are obtained from the first 
stage regression. V is the market capitalization and V50 is the median of V. P-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Bolded numbers are coefficients at 5% significance level. 
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Figure 1.1 Market Beta (β) First Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel A: Eurozone 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X        
 
 
This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated beta at t is based on data from t-36 to t. 
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Figure 1.1 Market Beta (β) First Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel B: Non-eurozone Europe 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X        
 
 
This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated beta at t is based on data from t-36 to t.   
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Figure 1.1 Market Beta (β) First Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel C: Outside of Europe 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X        
 
 
This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated beta at t is based on data from t-36 to t.   
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Figure 1.2 Exchange Rate Exposure (δ) First Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs) 
Panel A: Eurozone 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X        
 
This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated delta at t is based on data from t-36 to t.  
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Figure 1.2 Exchange Rate Exposure (δ) First Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel B: Non-eurozone Europe 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X        
 
This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated delta at t is based on data from t-36 to t. 
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Figure 1.2 Exchange Rate Exposure (δ) First Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs) 
Panel C: Outside of Europe 
s m
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This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated delta at t is based on data from t-36 to t.  
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Figure 1.3 Eurozone Market Beta (β) Second Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs) 
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This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated gamma at t is based on data from t-36 to t.  
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Figure 1.4 Eurozone Exchange Rate Exposure (δ) Second Stage Rolling Regression (MNCs) 
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This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated gamma at t is based on data from t-36 to t.   
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Figure 1.5 Market Beta (β) First Stage Rolling Regression Robustness Check (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel A: Eurozone 
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This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated beta at t is based on data from t-36 to t. 
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Figure 1.5 Market Beta (β) First Stage Rolling Regression Robustness Check (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel B: Non-Eurozone Europe 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X        
 
 
This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated beta at t is based on data from t-36 to t. 
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Figure 1.5 Market Beta (β) First Stage Rolling Regression Robustness Check (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel C: Outside of Europe 
s m
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This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated beta at t is based on data from t-36 to t.  
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Figure 1.6 Exchange Rate Exposure (δ) First Stage Rolling Regression Robustness Check (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel A: Eurozone 
s m
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This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated delta at t is based on data from t-36 to t.  
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Figure 1.6 Exchange Rate Exposure (δ) First Stage Rolling Regression Robustness Check (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel B: Non-Eurozone Europe 
s m
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This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated delta at t is based on data from t-36 to t.  
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Figure 1.6 Exchange Rate Exposure (δ) First Stage Rolling Regression Robustness Check (MNCs vs. Non-MNCs)  
Panel C: Outside of Europe 
s m
ijt ij ij jt ij jt ijtR R X        
 
 
This rolling regression figure shows the ending points of window size of 36 months. The estimated delta at t is based on data from t-36 to t
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CHAPTER 2 EXCHANGE RATE EXPOSURE OF THE UNITED STATES 
MULTINATIONALS: A FIRM- AND PORTFOLIO-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
Exchange rate fluctuations are widely believed to affect financial decision-making and the 
profitability of a firm. Corporate managers controlling risk and investors seeking to hedge their 
portfolios are both obviously interested in estimates of a firm’s exchange rate risk exposure; 
however, what is not so clear is the relation between exchange rate fluctuation and stock prices. 
The basic question that theoretical and empirical studies over the last two decades have grappled 
with is: Does a firm’s stock return fluctuate with the exchange rate? If the answer is affirmative, 
we can say that the firm is “exposed” to the exchange rate risk.  
Many studies have had difficulty documenting significant exchange rate exposure from stock 
returns, primarily because exchange rates may affect a firm through a variety of channels. 
According to the theory model from Bodnar and Marston (2002), the main two channels include 
the following: (1) a firm may produce domestically for export sales or sell (or produce with) 
imported products; and (2) a firm may produce and sell at subsidiaries abroad.34 They find that the 
exchange rate exposure elasticity35 should be larger for pure exporting and importing firms, but 
smaller for multinational firms (MNCs)36 theoretically. This is because that measured exposure 
elasticity is fundamentally a function of net foreign currency revenues and profit margins. MNCs 
                                                 
34 Dominguez and Tesar (2006) mention the third channel, firm influence from industry international competition, 
exists as well. Aggarwal and Harper (2010) provide empirical evidence that domestic companies do face significant 
exchange exposure through this third channel. 
35 The exchange rate exposure elasticity is the percentage change in firm value (return) per percentage change in the 
exchange rate. 
36 Economists are in disagreement as to how multinational corporations should be defined. Multinational corporations 
have many dimensions and can be viewed from several perspectives (ownership, management, strategy and structural, 
etc.) In Bodnar and Marston (2002), MNCs is defined for the firms which have none-zero foreign sales, the sales that 
happened in geographic segments other than the domestic market. This paper follows Bodnar and Marston (2002)'s 
definition.  
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that develop operational hedges, in which they offset foreign currency revenues and costs, can 
shield themselves from the large-scale effects of exchange rate changes. The exchange rate 
exposure puzzle37 of MNCs, which do not only have financial but also operational hedges, is 
featured prominently in many empirical studies, such as Choi and Prasad (1995), Gao (2000), Ihrig 
(2001), Crabb (2002), Ihrig and Prior (2005), Bartram et al. (2010), Jongen et al. (2012). 
Furthermore, the difficulty of operational hedge's data availability of MNCs creates obstacles for 
researchers.38  
In response to the puzzle of small exchange rate exposure elasticity in MNCs, this paper re-
considers several exchange rate exposure estimation issues using a new five-factor Fama-French 
model (2015) at both the firm- and portfolio-level in the context of US MNCs. Different from the 
general models in the previous studies which only included a market portfolio return as a control 
variable, this new model also controls for the size, value, profitability, and investment patterns in 
average stock market returns. In this way, much more of the influence of value-relevant 
macroeconomic shocks correlated with the exchange rate can be removed alongside the reduction 
of the residual variance of regression. This improves our ability to interpret the resulting residual 
exchange rate exposure estimates as related firms' cash flow sensitivities important for risk 
management decisions. The estimates from this new five-factor asset pricing model have a 
consistently superior performance at different statistically significant levels comparing to the 
estimates of other previous exposure models.  
                                                 
37 Theory predicts sizeable exchange rate exposure for many firms. However, empirical research has not documented 
such exposures. The discrepancy between theoretical predictions and observed levels of exchange rate exposure has 
been considered somewhat of an exchange rate exposure puzzle. 
38 If the firm-level operational hedge's data are available, researchers can have a full picture of a firm's hedging activity 
and examine if the hedging activity could explain the exchange rate exposure puzzle completely. 
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Multinational firms have an important channel----foreign sales----that other non-multinational 
firms are not exposed through. Foreign sales are the sales that happened in geographic segments 
other than the domestic market. Although the data such as net foreign currency revenues and profit 
margins of US MNCs mentioned in Bodnar and Marston (2002) which fundamentally determine 
the exposure elasticity are not available directly, the foreign sales is an imperfect but informative 
proxy in evaluating the relationship between exchange rate movements and stock returns. 
Thomson One Worldscope offers a high degree (10-scale) of detail on geographic segment data 
on sales for a large number of firms worldwide. However, the lack of standards for scale reporting 
leaves the data most in disarray and makes the data cleaning a complex. For this reason, many 
researchers only examine the size effect of foreign sales on exchange exposure. A few of them 
base their analysis on MNCs survey data, but the main limitation of survey data is that the data of 
too few firms (generally less than one hundred) are collected successfully to achieve a general 
conclusion.  
I clean up and calculate the size and geographic segments data of foreign sales of 532 US 
multinational firms from 2,213 non-financial US firms in Thomson One Worldscope over recent 
twenty years (Jan 1990 - Dec 2011) as the examination sample. Utilizing the vast sample set 
allowed me to employ a portfolio-level analysis that other studies have not done before. By making 
year-by-year portfolios grouped by foreign sale ratios and areas, this approach eliminates the key 
source of time-variant factors that may exist in the first- and second-regression approaches and 
therefore avoids problems related to assuming a constant linear relation between foreign sales and 
exchange exposure that is not imposed by theory. I find that (1) the relationship between the size 
of foreign sales and exchange exposure may not be linear, and (2) a broad exchange rate index 
captures comprehensively the exchange rate changes that affect a firm's stock return compared to 
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the bilateral exchange rate index. It accords with the conjecture that a firm could be statistically 
significantly exposed to some currency even if it has no foreign sales in that currency country. 
This research was not just limited to the contribution of introducing a portfolio-level analysis 
of US MNCs; I also provide new evidence for the conclusions in previous studies at the firm-level 
that lagged effects do exist in exchange exposure and exposure increases with the return horizon. 
Additionally, I extend the conclusions of volatility effects from crisis periods in previous studies 
to all large exchange rate volatile periods. This means the size of exchange rate movement itself, 
even if it is not associated with any big macroeconomic factor changes caused crisis, will still 
affect the exposure estimates to a statistically significant level. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the issues in the 
exchange rate exposure estimation, such as the choice of model, market index, exchange rate index, 
return time-horizon, etc. Section 3 describes the sample data and research methods used in this 
study. Section 4 presents both the firm- and portfolio-level empirical results, followed by Section 
5 consisting of summary and conclusions. 
 
2.2 Issues of Exchange Rate Exposure Estimation  
 The model development 
2.2.1.1 Total exchange rate exposure  
In early studies, exchange rate exposure is measured in terms of a firm's risk in its value (return) 
of fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate. Adler and Dumas (1984) present a method of estimating 
a firm's foreign exchange exposure on the basis of a one factor market regression model of the 
stock returns on the changes in exchange rates (the prices of currencies):  
s j j
it i i t itR X      (1) 
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where, s
itR  is the return of firm i at time period t, 
j
tX is the exchange rate change of currency or 
currency index j over time period t. Here, the coefficient j
i  measures the firm’s total exposure to 
exchange rates. 
This total exposure consists of two effects. The first effect is the average change in the present 
value of a firm's cash flow caused by exchange rate movements. The second effect is the value 
impact of market wide macroeconomic factors (non-cash-flow-related value, such as changes in 
the risk-free rate or investor sentiment) that are spuriously correlated with the exchange rate 
movements over the sample period (Bodnar and Wong, 2003). 
 
2.2.1.2 Residual exchange rate exposure 
To control for macroeconomic influences, Jorion (1990) upgrades the one-factor model to a 
two-factor regression model that includes the rate of market return from the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to explicitly control for market risk: 
s m j j
it i i t i t itR R X        (2) 
where, m
tR  is the return on the market index and the rest of the variables are defined as above, i  
is firm i's market beta, j
i  measures the firm’s residual exchange rate exposure in excess of the 
total market’s reaction to currency j's exchange rate movements,39 and it  is a zero-mean residual. 
If j
i  equals zero, it does not mean that the firm has zero exposure, but rather, that firm has the 
same exposure as the market portfolio.  
                                                 
39 Dominguez and Tesar (2006) call it marginal exposure in this context. They consider the advantage of marginal 
exposure is allowing one to distinguish between the direct effects of exchange rate changes and the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks that simultaneously affect firm value and exchange rates. In contrast to marginal exposure, 
total exposure measures the exposure of all firms as a group. 
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The sign of the residual exchange rate exposure ( j
i ) can be either positive or negative 
depending on the net exposed asset and liability positions of the firm. For example, firms that use 
their foreign subsidiaries principally to import finished goods and sell them in the US will benefit 
from an appreciation of the dollar. This benefit arises from a reduction in the dollar value of foreign 
costs. In contrast, firms that incur most of their cost of production in the US and sell in foreign 
markets have exposed foreign sales revenue. They find that their products become less competitive 
in overseas markets, and their foreign sales revenues declines with any appreciation of the dollar. 
Similarly, multinational firms with net exposed assets abroad will lose with a strengthening dollar, 
while firms with net exposed liabilities gain. 
Adding the market return reduces the residual variance of the regression and removes much of 
the influence of value-relevant macroeconomic shocks correlated with the exchange rate. This 
improves our ability to interpret the resulting exposure elasticities in terms of the corporate-
finance-based models as cash flow sensitivities important for risk management decisions.40 This 
two-factor model later became the norm later for estimating foreign exchange exposure, and has 
been used in a variety of studies such as Choi and Prasad (1995), Bartov et al. (1996), Chow et al. 
(1997a,1997b), He and Ng (1998), Gao (2000), Griffin and Stulz (2001), Bodnar and Wong (2003), 
Dominguez and Tesar (2001a, 2001b, 2006), Bartram and Karolyi (2006), Doidge et al. (2006), 
Bartram and Bodnar (2007, 2012), Aggarwal et al. (2011), and Jongen et al. (2012) among others.  
But while the additional information provided by this model is undeniable, two questions arise 
at the same time. The first was whether exchange rate variation series are potentially autocorrelated. 
Gao (2000) recommends regressing exchange rates on macroeconomic variables to get unexpected 
                                                 
40 Bodnar and Wong (2003) state that the exposure of the market portfolio consists of the effects of both 
macroeconomic factors and the value impact of the exchange rate changes on the forms' cash flows. Thus, the 
"residual" exposure estimates are measured relative to both factors as well.  
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exchange rate variations and shows that regressing stock returns on these unexpected exchange 
rate variables have significantly stronger effects on firm value than the original exchange rate 
variation series. In contrast, Meese and Rogoff (1983) and many other works show that individual 
exchange rates follow a nearly random walk process. The other question is the possible 
multicollinearity problem between market risk and exchange risk factors.41 This problem can be 
solved by either orthogonalizing the exchange rate fluctuations on market return, or vice-versa. 
Another approach to handle it is to detect the forces which may drive market returns and exchange 
rate fluctuations simultaneously and add them as additional explanatory variables (through an 
orthogonalization procedure) into the model to lower endogeneity problems.42  
Since the rate of market return in CAPM still did not capture certain factors that impact firm 
return, the classic two-factor model (1990) underwent three important upgrades over the next 20 
years. The first upgrade was made by Fama and French (1993) who solved two previously 
unexplained patterns: size (market capitalization) and value versus growth to build a classic three-
factor Fama-French (FF) model, which was later widely adopted till now:43  
( )s f m f j jit t i i t t i t i t i t itR R R R s SMB h HML X           (3) 
                                                 
41 Muller and Verschoor (2006b) reported statistics showing that the CRSP US value-weighted market index is not 
strongly correlated with any of US dollar exchange rate index. 
42 Chow et al. (1997a, 1997b) and Chow and Chen (1998) include business condition variables (prevailing yield, 
default premium, and term premium) instead of market risk according to Fama and French (1989). Gao (2000) replaces 
the market risk factor and exchange rate risk factor by six macroeconomic variables and exchange rate risk premium, 
respectively. See (Muller and Verschoor, 2006c) for more detail discussion. 
43
 The Fama-French factors are constructed using the 6 value-weight portfolios formed on size and book-to-market.  
SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big 
portfolios,      
 
 
1/ 3        
1/ 3        
SMB Small Value Small Neutral Small Growth
Big Value Big Neutral Big Growth
  
  
 
HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth 
portfolios,    
   1/ 2     1/ 2     HML Small Value Big Value Small Growth Big Growth     
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where s
itR  is still the stock return of firm i at time t, 
f
tR  is the risk free return, 
m f
t tR R  is the 
market risk premium (market return minus risk free rate) and replaces the market index return used 
in the previous two models, tSMB  is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios 
of  small stocks and big stocks, and tHML  is the difference between the returns on diversified 
portfolios of high book-to-market (value) stocks and low book-to-value (growth) stocks. Hsin et 
al (2007) and Aggarwal and Harper (2010) employ this model in their exchange rate exposure 
analysis of US domestic firms.44  
Although the three-factor FF model captures the size and value patterns in post-1962 US 
average returns better than the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the model’s explanation of 
average returns is far from complete. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that the US stock returns 
also exhibit momentum: stocks that have done well over the past year tend to continue to do well. 
In an attempt to also capture momentum returns, Carhart (1997) made the second upgrade and 
proposed a four-factor model for the US firm returns:  
( )s f m f j jit t i i t t ii i t i t itttR R R R s SM wWMLB h HML X           (4) 
where a momentum, tWML , is the difference between the month t returns on diversified portfolios 
of the winners and losers of the past year. 
In 2015, motivated by the previous evidence from Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Novy-Mars 
(2013) and others, Fama and French made the third important upgrade and published a five-factor 
                                                 
44 Dumas and Solnik (1995), De Santis and Gerard (1998), and Doukas et al. (2003) include Fama-French financial 
variables into an international or a multifactor CAPM which indicate foreign exchange rate risk premia to be a 
significant element of securities rates of return in international financial markets. 
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model. They included profitability and investment factors into the classic three-factor model and 
made it become redundant for describing average stock returns:45  
( )s f m f j jit t i i t t i i i i i t i t i t itR R R R s SMB h HML rRMW c CMA X             (5) 
where tRMW  is the difference between the returns on diversified firm portfolios of stocks with 
robust and weak profitability, tCMA  
is the difference between the returns on diversified firm 
portfolios of the stocks of low and high investment firms, which we call conservative and 
aggressive, and other variables are defined as above. Controlling for market movements and the 
other four important factors that affect stock returns, this model reflects the percentage change in 
stock returns explained by exchange rate movements in coefficient j
i .
46  
 
 The choice of market index  
Since the residual, instead of total, exchange rate exposure is the estimated exposure after 
conditioning on the market portfolio, the choice of which market portfolio should be included in 
the regression becomes a significant decision. It directly impacts the size and interpretation of the 
resulting firm-specific residual exposure estimates.  
Generally speaking, a value-weighted portfolio gives more importance to large firms. Because 
these firms are more likely to be multinational and export-oriented (net sellers in foreign currency), 
they should see their cash flows increase when the home currency depreciates, thereby generating 
                                                 
45 Fama and French (2015) show that the model's performance is not sensitive to the way its factors are defined. 
46 Estimating exchange-rate exposure began with a very simple model, such as Jorion (1990), where a firm’s return 
was regressed on the market return and exchange rate movement. Results suggested there was minimal exposure, 
which was unsatisfying given the casual evidence heard in the media. As a result, the literature evolved to a more 
detailed analysis on trade shares and markups effects (Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001) and pass-through effects (Bodnar 
et al., 2002). These studies found more significant exposure, but added a lot of bells and whistles in the process. This 
paper focuses on the estimation of exchange rate exposure through different generations of CAPM models.    
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a more negative market portfolio exposure. Alternatively, an equal-weighted market portfolio 
gives more importance to small firms. As these firms are more likely to be import-oriented or non-
traded-good producers, they should see their cash flows rise when the home currency appreciates, 
thereby generating a more positive market portfolio exposure (Bodnar and Wong, 2003). Given 
that the exchange rate exposure study is usually conducted with international dimensions and 
capital markets are highly integrated in modern markets, a few studies specialized for small open 
economies also argue that a world market portfolio return should be used to control for 
macroeconomic factors.47 (see, e.g., Nydahl, 1999; Pritamani et al. 2004; Muller and Verschoor, 
2006b; Aggarwal and Harper, 2010) 
Two sides of empirical results are presented. Dominguez and Tesar (2001a, 2001b), Bodnar and 
Wong (2003), Pritamani et al (2004) and Dewenter et al. (2005) suggest that different 
constructions of market portfolios have different correlations with the exchange rate movement. 
Thus every study sample should employ its suitable market index. However, other exposure studies, 
such as Nydahl (1999), Dominguez and Tesar (2006) 48, Aggarwal and Harper (2010), and Aabo 
and Brodin (2014), find indifferent results between using the value- and equally-weighted market 
index or a world market index.49  
 
                                                 
47 There is a long-standing debate in the international asset pricing literature as to whether securities are priced locally 
in segmented markets or globally in a single, integrated market. Karolyi and Wu's working paper (2014) introduces a 
new partial-segmentation approach to capture both global and local factors in an extended CAPM model. 
48 Dominguez and Tesar (2006) find no difference between using the value- and equal-weighted market index but 
much more significant exposure using the international index. However, they consider the more firms appear to be 
exposed when the international index is used only because the exchange rate is picking up more of the variability of 
returns and the market is picking up substantially less. This is because that the adjusted-R2 in the regression using the 
international index falls significantly relative to the adjusted-R2 when the local market index is used. 
49 Nydahl (1999) find no difference between using the local market index and world index in a study of Swedish firms. 
Aggarwal and Harper (2010) find no difference between using the value- and equal-weighted market index in a study 
of US domestic firms. Aabo and Brodin (2014) find inconsistent conclusion for using value-, equal-weighted, and 
MSCI Europe index under weekly vs. monthly data in the study of Scandinavian firms. 
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 The choice of exchange rate index 
2.2.3.1 Common trade-weighted exchange rate index 
Deciding which measure of exchange rate changes to use appropriately in the model50 has been 
generally answered by using a common trade-weighted exchange rate index, as Adler and Dumas 
(1984) said that a firm's asset "may be simultaneously exposed to more than one currency". Jorion 
(1990) notes that an index is a parsimonious representation of the effect of exchange-rate changes 
that avoids the problem of multicollinearity when separate but positively correlated bilateral 
exchange rates are used in the regressions. 
The commonly used trade-weighted indexes in most existing studies of the US MNCs exchange 
rate exposure are produced by the Federal Reserve Board. They measure the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar in mainly three ways51: (1) Broad index. It is a weighted average of the foreign 
exchange values of the US dollar against the currencies of 26 major US trading partners. It 
comprises economies whose bilateral shares of the US merchandise imports or exports exceed 
0.5%, i.e. trade in services is excluded. Country coverage and weights are revised annually52; (2) 
Major Currencies (MAJCUR) index. Seven of the twenty-six currencies in the broad index, the 
euro, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, British pound, Swiss franc, Australian dollar, and Swedish 
krona, trade widely in currency markets outside their respective home areas, and these currencies 
(along with the US dollar) are referred to by the Broad staff as "major" currencies.53 Because the 
                                                 
50 Dominguez and Tesar (2001b, 2006) and Fraser and Pantzalis (2004) empirically describe how the choice of the 
index used to capture exposure influences the level of exposures observed. 
51 From 1971 to the end of 1998 the US Federal Reserve’s index profiled the G-10 currencies. It was revised when the 
euro replaced five of the previous ten currencies, and also because of changes in US trade patterns (Leahy 1998). The 
single G-10 index was replaced by three: a broad index, major currency index and other important trading partner 
index. 
52 Although the U.S. imports and exports weights of several of these economies have shifted in the intervening years 
since 1997, in some cases considerably, these twenty-six economies still accounted for more than 90% of U.S. trade 
in 2003. (Loretan 2005) 
53 Currencies of trading partners with a history of high inflation relative to the US are excluded (Leahy 1998; Loretan 
2005). The share of the seven major currencies in the broad dollar index is around a little bit less than 60%. The share 
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major currencies generally trade in liquid financial markets, the major currencies index can be 
used to gauge financial market pressures on the dollar (Loretan 2005)54; and 3) OITP index. The 
remaining nineteen currencies in the broad index are those of that the staff refers to as the "other 
important trading partners" (OITP) of the United States. It captures movements of the dollar 
against the currencies of key US trading partners in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and 
Eastern Europe.55 Moreover, the Dallas Fed and Atlanta Fed also produce a currency index used 
less frequently in foreign exchange exposure studies. A few studies which examine firms in other 
countries, such as Doidge et al. (2006), Bartram (2008), Zhou and Wang (2013), etc., employ the 
trade-weighted exchange rate indexes calculated by other central banks, such the Bank of England. 
Besides all sorts of FRB's exchange rate indexes, International Monetary Fund (IMF) computers 
the common trade-weighted indexes based on a multilateral exchange rate model (MERM) 
introduced by Artus and Rhomberg (1973). These indexes data are available in International 
Financial Statistics. Jorion (1990), Bartov and Bodnar (1994), He and Ng (1998), Chow et al. 
(1997a, 1997b), Chow and Chen (1998), Nydahl (1999), Makar and Huffman (2001), etc. all use 
MERM for the calculation of different countries' currency index during the time period of their 
respective studies. Many researchers even calculate the trade-weighted exchange rate themselves 
                                                 
of the seven major currencies in the broad index declined moderately between 1997 and 2003, from 58.4% to 54.8%, 
largely because of the growing relative importance of China and Mexico in U.S. international trade and the diminishing 
relative importance of Japan. 
54 In this role, the major currencies index is the successor to the staff's previous main dollar index, the so-called G-10 
index, which the staff no longer maintains (Loretan 2005). In Fraser and Pantzalis (2004), the correlation between the 
broad and major currencies indices is 0.82 over the duration of the study. In Aggarwal and Harper (2010), the 
correlation between the FRB indexes are as high as 0.90. 
55 These currencies account for more than 40% of the weight in the broad index in recent years, providing important 
measures of the competitiveness of US goods in those regions and vice versa. Because some of these economies have 
experienced episodes of hyperinflation, the nominal OITP index is likely to be most useful in analyzing shorter-term 
developments in dollar exchange rates. Methodology is under ongoing review, but no major overhauls have been made 
since its introduction (Loretan, 2005). 
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according to their research needs, either use the same MERM method or use several major 
currencies published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
However, a common trade-weighted exchange rate index has two drawbacks. Firstly, changes 
in the monthly trade-weighted value over most of the periods covered in earlier studies are small, 
making it difficult for investors to distinguish between signal and noise in the observed changes 
(Dewenter et al., 2005). This may lead to an underestimation of the impact of exchange rate shocks 
(Dominguez and Tesar, 2001b). Secondly, an exchange rate index may not be relevant for a firm 
or industry, especially those that have a particularly high exposure to only one or a few currencies 
through trade or foreign operations. Dominguez and Tesar (2001b) show that many firms are 
exposed to one or more bilateral currency rates whereas they are not exposed to the index and 
suggest that the relevance of currencies calculated from a function of the firm-specific strategic 
position may improve the exposure results.56  
 
2.2.3.2 Firm- and industry-specific exchange rate index 
Ihrig (2001), Fraser and Pantzalis (2004), and Jongen et al. (2012) calculate firm-specific trade-
weighted exchange rates by using information about the US multinationals’ foreign subsidiary 
locations in their weighting schemes. That is, the exchange rate index in these studies is a sum of 
bilateral (US dollar/foreign currency) exchange rates weighted by the number of subsidiaries of a 
US multinational in a given country relative to its total. Ihrig (2001) finds that the number of firms 
with significant exposure rises to 16 percent of the sample firms at the 10% level of significance 
from 10 percent, by using the firm-specific exchange rate instead of the JP Morgan broad exchange 
rate in the regression. Fraser and Pantzalis (2004) use firm-specific exchange rate proxies 
                                                 
56 They indicate the firms within the same industry have very different exposure coefficients and suggest using detailed 
firm-specific data. 
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including both subsidiary-weighted index and equal-weighted index. Although a higher number of 
firms with significant exposure should be found when the proxy is used more than the common 
index, the evidence from their studies only verified that these firm-specific exchange rates pick up 
more significant exposure than the major currencies (MAJCUR) index, but less than the FRB's 
broad index.57 Jongen et al. (2012) disaggregated the common trade-weighted exchange rate index 
into seven region-specific trade-weighted indices based on each individual firm’s trading or 
production links with the one of seven regions. Their estimation of foreign exposure with monthly 
data reveals that more than 33% of the 634 US multinationals are significantly affected by currency 
fluctuations. Furthermore, the industry-specific trade-weighted exchange rate may capture some 
firm-specific information as well. Ihrig and Prior (2005) 58 and Gao (2000) find the number of 
significantly exposed firms increases slightly when switching from a broad trade-weighted 
exchange rate to a 2-digit and 3-digital SIC industry-specific exchange rate, respectively. 
That using firm- and industry-specific exchange rates has not consistently and significantly 
improved the exposure results may be due to two weak points. First, according to Jorion (1990)'s 
statement, "the distinction between domestic and foreign operations is not always clear cut because 
of problems such as transfer pricing and cost allocation….. Recognizing these issues, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board has left management wide latitude for interpretation. As a result, the 
definition of foreign sales may differ across companies, which will create measurement errors." 
Hence, the firm-specific exchange rates calculated based on foreign operations information of each 
                                                 
57 Fraser and Pantzalis (2004) find that 8.7% (27 out of 310 firms) have significant exposure with a firm-specific index 
versus 5.5% (17 out of 311 firms) with the common MAJCUR index. However, neither of these measures results in 
the level of significance when the FRB’s broad index is used (12.6% or 39 of the 310 firms). Besides, they find 
evidence that the percentage of a firm’s foreign subsidiaries is positively related to exposure when exposure is 
measured with a firm-specific index and negatively related to exposure when a common index is used. 
58 Ihrig and Prior (2005) found 15% of MNEs (in total 548 US MNEs) have significant exposure when they use the 
industry-specific exchange rate.  
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company are easily subject to measurement errors as well. 59  Second, firms are exposed to 
currencies of countries where they are not operating. Some of the competitors of these firms may 
be incorporated in these countries, or some of these firms’ inputs to production may be 
denominated in those currencies (Muller and Verschoor, 2006c). From another aspect, firms may 
only hedge exposure to the more obvious currencies but remain exposed to currencies of countries 
with whom their goods compete on world markets but with no direct business (Dominguez and 
Tesar, 2001b). 
 
2.2.3.3 Bilateral exchange rates 
In additional to using of a trade-weighted exchange rate index, many studies use bilateral 
exchange rates because some firms, industries and countries are more affected by competitive 
pressures and currency changes originating in a particular country or region (see, e.g., Dominguez, 
1998; Nydahl, 1999; Chang, 2002; Parsley and Popper, 2006; Aggarwal and Harper, 2010; Choi, 
2012; Aabo and Brodin, 2014). The results do not consistently support the conclusion that bilateral 
exchange rate gives more generally significant results than a trade-weighted exchange rate index.  
Different from other works, Aysun and Guldi (2011) use the data to determine the exchange 
rate instead of restricting the analysis by measuring exposure of every firm to a single currency or 
a basket of currencies. They compared the regressions outputs individually using exchange rates 
measured as local currency in terms of major currencies such as the US Dollar, Euro, Japanese 
Yen, British pound and the trade weighted exchange rates. And then they identified the exchange 
rate for each firm (among the exchange rates with a significant coefficient) that generates the 
maximum size of exposure. Dominguez and Tesar (2001b, 2006) indicate that if they count all the 
                                                 
59 Jorion (1990), Bartram and Karolyi (2006), Dominguez and Tesar (2006), etc. discuss the data cleaning criterion 
for foreign sales in details. 
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firms exposed to "any" exchange rate (i.e. exposed to at least one of the three listed exchange rates, 
the trade weighted exchange rate, US Dollar, and currency of major trading partner), the number 
of exposed firms doubled in most countries they investigated. Consistently, Jong et al. (2006) 
indicated that the use of a trade-weighted currency index and the use of individual exchange rates 
are complements. 
 
2.2.3.4 Nominal and real exchange rates 
The use of nominal exchange rates is commonly accepted in exchange rate exposure studies. 
Nydahl (1999) argues that using nominal exchange rates is appropriate for low inflation countries 
- such as the Scandinavian countries - because of the high correlation between nominal and real 
exchange rates. Choi and Prasad (1995), Chamberlain et al. (1997), Griffin and Stulz (2001), 
Williamson (2001), Choi and Kim (2003), Martin and Mauer (2003), and Li et al. (2009), etc. 
argue that, for industrialized countries, the random walk and efficient markets hypotheses make 
both real and nominal exchange rates acceptable, and the use of real versus nominal exchange rates 
has a negligible effect on exposure estimates. Muller and Verschoor (2006c) give the similar 
reasons that, on one hand, nominal data is more easily available60 but on the other hand, many 
studies consistently show that the low variability of inflation differentials relative to exchange rate 
movements on a monthly basis implies that contemporaneous movements in real and nominal 
exchange rates are almost perfectly correlated. 
 
                                                 
60 If exchange rate movements are measured in real terms, all variables in the regression equation have to be measured 
in real terms for consistency. 
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 Long-term effects 
2.2.4.1 Lagged effects 
The issue of long-term effects in foreign exchange exposure should be considered through two 
lenses. Firstly, how a firm's value is affected by contemporaneous or lagged exchange rate changes 
in nature? Bartov and Bodnar (1994) find that the one-period lagged exchange rate changes have 
stronger explanatory power for US firm returns than do the contemporaneous exchange rate 
changes. Fraser and Pantzalis (2004) show that the number of the US firms that have significant 
one-period lagged exchange rate exposure is more than half of the number of the US firms that are 
significantly exposed to contemporaneous changes in the exchange rate.61  Hsin et al. (2007) 
demonstrates that the lagged exposure is, on average, about as important, in terms of size, as 
contemporaneous exposure.62 Taking it one step further, Makar and Huffman (2001) provide 
evidence that the lagged US firm value effects on exchange rate changes are particular to low 
foreign exchange derivatives users. 
However, in contrast to the US firms, the lagged exchange rate effect is not found in existing 
empirical studies of other countries. He and Ng (1998), Dominguez (1998), Nydahl (1999), 
Doukas et al. (2003), and Jong et al. (2006) find only weak lagged effect in Japanese firms, 
Swedish firms and Dutch firms, respectively.63  
On one side, investors usually lack sufficient information about the firm's activities to hedge 
foreign currency exposures, how the firm's real internal activities will be altered in response to the 
                                                 
61 In Fraser and Pantzalis (2004)'s result, firms showing significant lagged exposure are not necessarily the same firms 
that exhibit contemporaneous exposure. 
62 They even detect there is a tendency for the reactions to currency changes to be revised in the opposite direction 
during the next period, which in turn leads to a reduction in sum-exposure. 
63 He and Ng (1998) find only 6 out of 171 Japanese firms have statistically significant one period lagged exchange 
rate exposure, while Nydahl (1999) find that only 3 out of 47 Swedish firms and Jong et al. (2006) find only 8 out of 
117 Dutch firms. Dominguez (1998) and Doukas et al. (2003) find adding a lagged exchange rate change item in the 
regression does not influence the contemporaneous exposure effect in his study on Japanese firms. 
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new competitive conditions, or whether the currency movement will result in a change in the 
strategic behavior of the firm. Their reaction is delayed until the rate changes affect observable 
firm cash flows (Dewenter et al., 2005). On the other side, even the firm managers are sometimes 
uncertain about how impactful a rise or fall of a currency will be on a firm's activities. It takes a 
long time for the market to fully incorporate exchange rate changes into firm value. As the market 
obtains more time-series data and gains more experience with this relation, we should see a 
decrease in the importance of the lagged relation and an increase in the importance of the 
contemporaneous relation. In short, the results of existing studies suggest that the 
contemporaneous effect of exchange rate changes on firm returns is most important, while the 
importance of lagged effect is diminishing over time because of investors' learning. 
 
2.2.4.2 Time horizon effects 
Secondly, how long is the appropriate estimation horizon for measuring foreign exchange 
exposure? This question has been addressed in studies such as Chow et al. (1997a, 1997b), Chow 
and Chen (1998), Griffin and Stulz (2001), Bodnar and Wong (2003), Muller and Verschoor 
(2006a), Aggarwal and Harper (2010), Jongen et al. (2012), and Aabo and Brodin (2014).64 They 
examined the time horizon range from one week to 60 months.65  
Chow et al. (1997a) found that stock returns are significantly correlated with exchange rate 
changes for 6-, 12-, and 24- month horizons, but they are not exposed for horizons shorter than 6 
                                                 
64 Although Bodnar and Wong (2003) and Muller and Verschoor (2006a) argue that the efficient market theory implies 
that the exchange rate exposure should be independent of the observation frequency, these empirical studies do find 
that the estimated number of firms with significant exchange rate exposure increases as the horizon lengthens in 
general. 
65 Chow et al. (1997a) examine the time horizon of 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 24-, 36-, and 48-month. Chow et al. (1997b) examine 
1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 24-, 36-month. Chow and Chen (1998) examine 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 24-month. Griffin and Stulz (2001) 
examine weekly, quarterly, and yearly. Bodnar and Wong (2003) examine 1-, 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-, 15-, 18-, 21-, 24-, 36-, 
48-, and 60-month. Muller and Verschoor (2006a) examine 1-week, 1-, 3-, 12-month. Aggarwal and Harper (2010) 
and Jongen et al. (2012) examine 1-, 3-, and 12-month. Aabo and Brodin (2014) examine weekly and monthly. 
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months or longer than 36 months. They attributed this to the fact that current exchange-rate 
changes can be hedged or the cash flow effects are offset by interest-rate effects in the short run 
(and not the long run).66  In Bodnar and Wong (2003), the total percentage of firms with significant 
exposure is around 20% to 25% for horizons of 1 to 21 months, but increases up to 60% for the 
60-month horizon. Consistent with the literature, Dominguez and Tesar (2006) found that exposure 
is indeed increasing in the return horizon for most firms in eight developed countries. This 
indicates that the impacts of exchange rate changes are longer lasting or more permanent in nature 
than initially suggested. 
Muller and Verschoor (2007) surmise the long-term effect could be because either financial 
managers ignore their shareholders’ exposure to the currencies of their major trading partners in 
the risk-management decision-making process or there is an economic exposure that is unrelated 
to known transactions and is therefore difficult to anticipate.  
 
 Crisis versus non-crisis period 
Accounting for the fact that the exchange rate movements during crisis periods may affect a 
firm’s balance sheet, and therefore returns, more dramatically than the normal periods, a few 
studies have investigated whether a crisis (or the size of exchange rate movements) is a key factor 
in the exchange exposure results.  
Ihrig (2001) thus added an additional crisis term in the model to capture the effect of a crisis on 
exposure. He showed that the average exchange rate exposure is estimated to be 0.55 when there 
are normal fluctuations in the exchange rate and 2.8 during crisis periods. This is in line with 
Chang (2002), who showed that fewer (more) industries are significantly affected by the exchange 
                                                 
66 Chow et al. (1997a) argue that interest-rate and cash-flow effects are offsetting over short horizons but 
complementary over long horizons. 
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rate changes when the currency market was less (more) volatile. Ihrig and Prior (2005) support the 
argument that the size of exchange rate movements does matter in estimating exchange rate 
exposure of US manufacturing firms as well. Furthermore, they notice that some firms have 
significant exposure only in crisis periods while others have significant exposure only during 
normal fluctuations in exchange rates. This may due to the different hedging strategies are 
employed by different firms according to their needs.67  
For emerging markets, Parsley and Popper (2006) investigated exchange rate exposures in 
eastern Asian countries and confirmed that the most widespread exchange rate exposures occurred 
during the Asian crisis period even in countries with a pegged exchange rate regime.68 Kiymaz 
(2003) further examined the foreign exchange exposure of Turkish firms prior to and following 
the crisis, indicating that the post-crisis exposures of all industries seemed to be lower than those 
of the pre-crisis period. This implies that firms likely paid more attention to their foreign exchange 
exposure following the crisis. 
 
 Nonlinearity 
Many recent studies (see, e.g., Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; Williamson, 2001; Di Iorio and Faff, 
2001; Dominguez and Tesar, 2001b;69 Doukas et al., 2003; Koutmos and Martin, 2003; Priestley 
and Ødgaard, 2007; Pierdzioch and Kizys, 2010) report evidence of time-varying exchange rate 
exposure at the firm level, market level and country sector level. Some of them further exhibit that 
                                                 
67
 Ihrig and Prior (2005) explain that "firms with significant exposure during a crisis, but not in normal months, could 
be using exchange rate hedges in normal states but that these hedging opportunities are not available during crises. 
For those firms that see their returns affected by small exchange rate movements but not during crises, perhaps they 
are not hedging for cost/benefit reasons, but take the time to operationally hedge large fluctuations in the US dollar". 
68 Parsley and Popper (2006) find firms were less hedged under pegged exchange rates after accounting for the local 
macroeconomic conditions that affect aggregate local returns. This may reflect the limitations of local financial market 
development rather than a resistance to hedging.  
69 "While there is time-variation in exposure at the firm level, the overall extent of exposure is not sample-dependent". 
Dominguez and Tesar (2001b) 
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the stock returns asymmetrically responsed to the sign and magnitude of exchange rate movements, 
size of firms and nature of industries. Muller and Verschoor (2006b) demonstrate that asymmetries 
in exchange rate exposures are more pronounced towards large versus small currency fluctuations 
than over depreciation and appreciation cycles. On one side, this is because a firm may choose 
different hedging strategies according to the hedging cost which is associated with the size of price 
changes. 70 On the other side, some hedging strategies are asymmetric themselves. For instance, 
currency options provide the downside protection while allowing the upside potential.71 It is this 
very asymmetric nature that would lead one to the hypothesis that evidence of exchange rate 
exposure may display an asymmetric behavior (Di Iorio and Faff, 2001) or conclude that 
asymmetric hedging is responsible for reshaping the relationship between a firm’s characteristics 
and its currency exposure (Hsin et al., 2007). This is also why Koutmos and Martin (2003) and 
Koutmos (2007) found that asymmetric exposure is prevalent within the financial sector due to 
hedging activities.72 However, Aysun and Guldi (2011) indicate that firms' hedging activities 
decrease linear exposure but don't affect nonparametric exposure.73 
Additionally, Booth (1996) shows that exposure varies dramatically at ‘trigger points’, whereas 
the nature of the market structure changes and governments intervene to assist industries that are 
suffering from increased imports or an erosion of export markets. Bartram (2004) presents that the 
                                                 
70 "An exporting firm may, for instance, decide to allow its markup to absorb the effect of small changes in currency 
movements, which leads to a low pass-through effect. In contrast, large exchange rate fluctuations may force the 
exporter to deviate from his policy and pass-through part of the currency change into export prices. The fact that pass-
through is generally positively related to the size of the change in exchange rates shows that the impact of currency 
movements on firm cash-flows depends on the magnitude of these movements and tends to confirm the asymmetric 
currency exposure hypothesis" (Koutmos and Martin, 2003). Bodnar et al. (2002) emphasize that the pass-through 
effects depend on the elasticity of substitution between home-produced and foreign-produced goods, firms' market 
share objectives and their trade and production constraints. 
71 In contrast, forward and futures, which demonstrate symmetric nature, may protect the holder against the potential 
financial loss due to foreign exchange exposure, but also eliminate the possibility of a financial gain if the exchange 
rate moves favorably.  
72They also find asymmetric exposure within the consumer non-cyclical sector, which may be attributed to asymmetric 
PTM and/or hysteretic behaviors. 
73 Their conclusion is only based on firm level derivatives usage data of S&P firms. 
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existence of significant nonlinear exposure is not sensitive to the type of foreign exchange rates. 
Koutmos (2007) finds that the time-varying exposure is smaller (larger) for the largest (smallest) 
firms and for industrial (technology) firms in the United States.  
 
2.3 Data and Methodology  
 Sample selection and data 
A total of 2,213 non-financial US firms74 which publicly traded in any period from January 
1991 to December 2011 are collected as the raw sample. Because this paper focuses on the 
exchange rate exposure of US MNCs, firms without foreign sales or foreign assets are not included 
in the sample. Thomson One Worldscope contains 10-scale geographic segment data for a large 
number of firms worldwide. Each firm's annual foreign sales are calculated accordingly to 
complete the elimination process. Finally, 532 firms with foreign sales over nine years 
continuously remain in the examination sample. A nine-year period is chosen as a threshold 
because this study employs mostly monthly data, and nine years ensures that each firm has at least 
108 observations, a number big enough to ensure statistical significance when we run regression 
for each firm individually.  
Table 2.1 provides summary information of the degree of data coverage in the examination 
sample. Market capitalization (year-end), total assets, total sales, international assets, foreign sales 
in percentage to total sales, and the number of firms with foreign sales by areas are described. We 
report foreign sales in three major categories by area: Asia (including Japan), Eurozone and the 
UK. This is because US MNCs have typically dominated foreign sales in these three areas and the 
                                                 
74 Financial firms are characterized by different attitudes towards financial risks from non-financial firms given their 
business objectives. Financial sector includes banks, unit trusts, investment companies, capital investment trusts, 
venture capital trusts, mutual funds, offshore investment companies, other investment, specialty and other finance 
companies, life and other insurance companies, etc. 
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three highest traded currencies (Japanese Yen, Euro and British Pound), except the US dollar will 
inevitably have an important influence on US MNCs' revenue.  
Since the publication of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) no. 14 in 
December 1976, US companies have been required to disclose a geographical analysis of foreign 
operations to the extent that foreign operations account for more than 10% of total operations. 
However, the distinction between domestic and foreign operations is not always clear cut due to 
problems such as transfer pricing and cost allocation. Recognizing these issues, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has left management wide latitude open to interpretation. 
The definition of foreign sales may differ across companies when they are reporting. In addition, 
the geographic segment data lack standards for scale reporting. For instance, a firm with foreign 
sales in the UK may report the responding foreign sales as it is sold in the "UK" specifically, or 
may just report as sold in "West Europe", "Europe", or "Europe and Asia", etc. In Table 2.1, 
therefore, 398 out of 532 firms having foreign sales in Europe only indicate that they have foreign 
sales in one or more European countries. It does not mean that they either only have foreign sales 
in Europe or that Europe is the major area for their foreign sales. Besides, 180 out of 532 firms 
have foreign sales in Japan or other Asian countries. Out of 532 firms, 155 report specifically and 
separately that they have foreign sales in the United Kingdom.  
Among 532 US MNCs in the examination sample, over 72% (385 out of 532) of firms are in 
the industry of manufacturing, around 14% (74 out of 532) in service sector, and the rest of the 
14% of firms are in mining, construction, transportation, etc. As stated in the beginning of this 
section, all firms in financial sector are excluded from the examination sample. Furthermore, there 
are no MNCs from public administration sector with foreign sales, so they are also not included in 
the sample.  
   
69 
 
Monthly firm-level stock returns over the period of 1991M1 to 2011M12 are drawn from 
Thomson One Banker (consisting of Thomson financial, Datastream, and Worldscope). Fama-
French five factors data and momentum factor data are monthly data drawn from Fama-French 
research website at Dartmouth College.75 Value-weighted market index is employed because the 
sample is dominated by large firms that are likely to be multinationals (see section 2.2.2 for 
detailed discussion). Moreover, MNCs included in the examination sample have had foreign sales 
data more than nine years, so they are generally larger than the rest of the MNCs in the raw sample 
that have had foreign sales less than nine years. The trade-weighted exchange rates are monthly 
data obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. In order to be consistent with other 
variables in the regression, instead of real effective, the nominal effective exchange rate is used. 
During the study period of this paper, the correlation between nominal and real effective US dollar 
exchange rate was 0.89. Since they are so closely correlated, the regression results on exchange 
rate exposure do not differ significantly. 
 
 Estimation methods 
We estimate exchange rate exposure at the firm-level and portfolio-level respectively. At the 
firm-level estimation, we firstly estimate marginal exchange rate exposure for the 532 
multinational firms individually using monthly data from January 1991 to December 2011. The 
results of four models (the two-factor model, the three-factor Fama-French model, the three-factor 
Fama-French with momentum, and the five-factor Fama-French market model) are compared to 
select the best performance model for further estimations. Secondly, we add lagged values of 
exchange rate index in the regression model to see if they have stronger explanatory power for the 
                                                 
75 Data Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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US firm returns than the contemporaneous exchange rate changes.76 Thirdly, following Bodnar 
and Wong's (2003) method, we estimate exchange exposures over multiple return horizons. For a 
horizon of one month, the estimation is based on non-overlapping monthly observations.77 Long-
horizon returns are continuously compounded over the corresponding intervals, and the estimation 
is based on overlapping monthly observations.78 We corrected for the serial correlation induced by 
the use of overlapping observations using the method of Newey and West (1987).79 Finally, we 
investigate the effect of the size of exchange rate movement, which is a possible key factor 
impacting exchange exposures results. Since the policy change and other factors may also cause a 
temporary disruption in exchange rate, we do not test the crisis period alone. Instead, the estimation 
is undertaken for all large volatile periods of Japanese yen, Euro and British pound separately. 
Moreover, we conduct all significant tests at the both 5% and 10% levels for each tail.  
At the portfolio-level, we test two hypotheses, i.e. two general debates in exchange exposure 
estimations. One is whether a multinational firm with a larger percentage of foreign sales to total 
sales is more likely to be exposed to exchange rate movements. We break the sample firms into 
three groups based on the breakpoints for the bottom 30% (small size), middle 40% (medium size) 
and top 30% (large size) of the percentage of a firm's foreign sales to total sales in each year to 
                                                 
76 The variance inflation factor (VIF) for each regressor is calculated. The maximum VIF of around 2 indicates that 
there is no evidence for collinearity between regressors. Since regressors are either rate changes or value differences, 
none of them are indicated to be autocorrelated via ADF unit root test. For the same reason, the lagged exchange rates 
adding to the basic model does not cause any further estimation problems. 
77 The most commonly used observation frequency of the stock return data is monthly frequency so far (Bartram & 
Bodnar, 2007). Few studies use quarterly or daily frequency. Chow et al. (1997a) argue that monthly frequency is 
more appropriate than daily frequency since daily data introduce too much noise relative to low frequency data.  
78 For example, in the three-month horizon examination, stock return at period t is the difference between stock prices 
at period t+3 and t divided by the stock price at period t. 
79 The Newey-West procedure is traditionally used to account for serial correlation of unknown form in the residuals 
of a single time series. It can be modified for use in a panel data set by estimating only correlations between lagged 
residuals in the same cluster. Bodnar and Wong (2003) and Muller and Verschoor (2006a) have a further discussion 
on using the Newey-West method to correct standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
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make year-by-year firm portfolios.80 We then estimate each year-by-year portfolio exposure over 
1-, 3- and 12-month return horizons using panel data regression to determine if the choice of time 
horizon affects the portfolio-level results. The long-horizon return estimations are based on 
overlapping monthly observations as we employed in firm-level estimations.  
Another hypothesis we test at portfolio-level is whether choosing an exchange rate index 
consistent with a firm's foreign sales area will improve the significance of exposure results. 
According to the reported plants aboard data of foreign sales of the US MNCs and the regions 
where the three major international currencies circulate, we pick four representative areas to 
investigate in this paper. They are Japan, the UK, Europe and Eurozone. In each area, we make 
year-by-year portfolios composed of the firms having foreign sales in that area that year. The 
portfolio exposures are estimated over 1-, 3- and 12-month return horizons. We compare the 
regression results between two different exchange rate indexes, the board exchange rate index and 
major bilateral exchange rate in the area.  
The advantage of portfolio-level to firm-level regression is the elimination of a key source of 
time-variant factors by making year-by-year portfolios. This is reasonable because many factors 
(including unobservable factors) that may affect each firm's stock return, such as a firm's product 
quality, sophistication, size, debt ratio, asset tangibility (long-term asset ratio), usually do not 
change quickly within a year. In actuality, the firm effect may be little important in regressions 
where the dependent variable is returns (the rate of value changes) and excess returns are generally 
serially uncorrelated.81 Additionally, there is no correlation problem between observations on 
                                                 
80 The splitting breakpoints follow the ones used in Fama and French (1993) when they break stocks into three groups 
based on the ranked values of a factor. These breakpoints are also general choices in other existing papers as long as 
the tests results are not sensitive to these choices. 
81 Fama and MacBeth (1973) develope the technique to account for correlation between observations on different 
firms in the same year. They examine the serial correlation of the residuals in their results and find that it is close to 
zero. 
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different firms in the same portfolio, since the observations of all regressors are identical for these 
firms. Again, we use the Newey-West approach to correct standard errors for potential correlation 
existing between lagged residuals in the same cluster.  
In order to investigate whether a firm has consistency between its foreign currency exposure 
and foreign sales locations, we further report different situation matches in Table 2.5. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
 Firm-level results  
The results are qualitatively similar between all four models, including the two-factor model, 
the three-factor Fama-French model, the three-factor Fama-French with momentum and the five-
factor Fama-French market model. As exhibited in Panel A of Table 2.2, among the four models, 
the two-factor model has the best performance (catches significant exposures for around 20% of 
total sample firms) at the Newey-West corrected 10% significant level, while the five-factor Fama-
French market model has the best performance (catches around 14%) at a 5% level. The five-factor 
Fama-French market model has a general advantage at all three significant levels and especially 
when capturing average stock returns at a higher significant level. We present only the results of 
the five-factor Fama-French market model in the following tables. 
In Panel B and C of Table 2.2, long-term effects are examined in lags and different time 
horizons respectively. We find 58 US firms having significant one-period lagged exchange rate 
exposure at 10% significant level. This number is larger than half of the number of US firms (95 
firms) significantly exposed to contemporaneous changes in the exchange rate at the same 
significant level. Without counting the duplicate firms that exhibit both contemporaneous and 
lagged exposures, there is total of 156 non-duplicate firms showing significant exposure either 
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contemporaneously or in the one or two lagged period. This means that considering the time for 
the market to fully incorporate exchange rate changes into firm values, the sample US MNCs with 
significant exposures will jump from only 18% (95 out of 532 firms) to 29% (156 out of 532 firms). 
This percentage also increases from 12% (63 out of 532 firms) to 16% (86 out of 532 firms) when 
accounting at a 5% significant level. One- and two-period lagged exchange rate changes show a 
strong explanatory power for US MNCs returns.82 This finding is consistent with other papers' that 
also examined US firms, such as Bartov and Bodnar (1994), Fraser and Pantzalis (2004) and Hsin 
et al. (2007). (See section 2.2.4 for detailed discussion.) 
Panel C presents the results for the time horizons of one, three and twelve months. Recall one-
month horizon estimation is based on non-overlapping monthly observations, and three- and 
twelve-month horizon estimations are based on overlapping monthly observations.83 The total 
percentage is around 13.5% (72 out of 532 firms) for the one-month horizon at a 5% significant 
level, and increases dramatically up to 61.5% (327 out of 532 firms) for a twelve-month horizon 
at the same significant level. The slight difference between the result numbers from "Panel A, M1" 
and "Panel C, 1-m" is attributed to the use of two different data sources (Fama-French website and 
Thomson One Banker respectively), which was done to keep the data consist within Panels A and 
C respectively. (See footnote 79.) The finding of an increase in the percentage of significant 
exposure estimates with long horizons is consistent with the findings of Chow et al. (1997a), 
Bodnar and Wong (2003), Dominguez and Tesar (2006), etc. (See section 2.2.4 for detailed 
discussion) 
                                                 
82 We estimated all one- to four-period lagged exchange rate changes. The results with three- and four-lagged results 
are not reported in Table 2 but available up on requested. 
83 Since the moving 3-month and 12-month data of SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA cannot be calculated by their 
overlapping monthly observations, we use Model 1 instead of Model 4 in the time horizon effects estimations. For the 
same reason, the data of "Rm – Rf" we calculated in Table 1 Panel C is consistently from Thomson One Banker, while 
the data of "Rm – Rf" we use in Table 1 Panel A is calculated directly by Fama and French using a consistent data 
source with their data calculation of SMB, HML, RMW and CMA. 
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Large volatility effects are arranged in Panel D. Following the most existing papers, we define 
a large volatile period if the absolute value of exchange rate change in the period is larger than 5% 
within three months. During the 252 months of the full sample period, the Japanese yen 
experienced large volatility for 101 months, the Euro for 109 months and the British pound for 60 
months. These numbers include the cases that two or three currencies experience the large 
volatility in the same month. In total, there are 169 out of 252 months (near 70% of the full sample 
period) that show large volatiles for yen, euro, or pound. The row labeled "any LVP", short for 
"any large volatile period", lists the results of the firms that have significant exposures during these 
169 months. The remainder of the 81 months doesn't have large volatiles in any of these three 
currencies. They are labeled "normal period". Comparing the results of large volatile and normal 
periods, we find that only 18% of sample firms (94 out of 532 firms) are significantly exposed in 
normal periods at 5% significant level. This is almost less than the half of the number of 
significantly exposed firms (173 out of 532 firms) during large volatile periods at the same 
significant level.84 Note that, as also shown in Ihrig and Prior (2005), some firms have significant 
exposure only in large volatile periods while others have significant exposure only in normal 
exchange rate fluctuations. (See footnote 62 for an explanation of this phenomenon.) To check the 
robustness of these results, we define changes in the exchange rate between 0% and 3% as small 
changes and changes greater than 3% as large changes. These results (unreported) indicate that the 
magnitude of returns on the difference portfolios for large exchange rate movements is similar to 
those displayed in Table 2.2. 
 
                                                 
84 During the full sample periods, the correlation between yen and pound is 0.19, yen and euro is 0.24, and euro and 
pound is 0.49. If the correlation between the three currencies were zero, exposure to any of three would simply be the 
sum of the exposure to the three currencies separately. 
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 Portfolio-level results  
A general debate on conjectures of the relationship between foreign sales and exchange 
exposure is that a multinational firm with a larger percentage of foreign sales is more likely to be 
exposed to exchange rate risks, or the opposite claim that it is, less likely to be exposed due to its 
economy of scale that use operational hedges to offset foreign currency revenues and costs, and 
therefore shield itself from the large-scale effects of exchange rate risks. The results in Table 2.3 
indicate that the relationship between foreign sales and exchange exposure may not fall on either 
side, i.e. may not be linear. The most significant exposures are actually from the firms with a 
medium size of foreign sales proportion. Of the 21 year-by-year portfolios, 33% show a significant 
exchange exposure at the 5% level for 1-month return horizon, and this number increases to 52% 
and 71% for 3- and 12-month horizons respectively. Firms in small and large size groups only 
have 24% of 21 year-by-year portfolios showing significant exchange exposures for 1-month 
horizon at the same significance level. The longer horizons estimates do not indicate a big increase 
on this percentage (all under 33%) for both the small and large size groups. However, the 
magnitude of exposure in the medium size group is almost less than half of the small and large 
size groups on both positive and negative directions. Conclusively, US MNCs with a medium size 
of foreign sales proportion have consistently significant (statistically) yet lower magnitude of 
exchange exposures than ones with a small or larger size of foreign sales proportion. This finding 
is true for all examined horizons at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.  
This result is, to some extent, consistent with the conclusion of Jorion (1990), Chow et al. 
(1997b) and Doidge et al. (2006), which examined exposures in the context of US MNCs as well.85 
                                                 
85 Chow et al. (1997b) examine the exchange rate exposure of a sample of 213 diversified multinational firms at firm-
level from March 1977 to December 1991. Doidge et al. (2006) examine 18 countries (including US MNCs portfolio 
of 320 firms) separately. They employ a different portfolio approach which allows exposures to be both non-linear 
and time varying. 
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Jorion (1990) finds and insignificant result for oil firms which have higher foreign sales 
proportions (above 50%), whereas significant result for non-oil firms with lower foreign sales 
(below 50%).86 Chow et al. (1997b) find that the magnitude of exposure at the firm-level is 
significantly related to firm size, but not to the relative share of foreign sales to total sales. Doidge 
et al. (2006) show that, at the portfolio-level, significant exchange exposures can be found when 
firms have higher foreign sales proportions than lower proportions. However, this is only true in 
the context of France, Japan and the UK MNCs, whereas no such relation is presented in the US. 
The theoretical model of Bodnar and Marston (2002) supports this finding as well: the exchange 
exposure is a function of net foreign currency revenues and profit margins, which are related to 
the foreign sales proportion, but no linear relationship between exchange exposure and foreign 
sales proportion can be derived directly. Moreover, the studies that find a linear relationship 
between exposure and foreign sales proportion, such as Nydahl (1999) and Dominguez and Tesar 
(2006), only show evidence for Sweden, France, Germany, Japan and the UK, but not for the US. 
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the magnitude of exchange rate risk that a 
firm faces is generally positively related to its net foreign currency revenues, but the capability to 
manage and hedge the exchange rate risk is generally positively related to its market capitalization 
size. Note that a firm with a large proportion of foreign sales is not necessary a large-sized firm. 
The residual exchange exposure is a combination result of these two opposite direction effects and 
thus need not be linear related to the foreign sales proportion. Some studies that define a firm as a 
multinational when foreign sales are 25% or more of total sales may find a linear relationship, 
because the conclusion they obtain is only based on MNCs with medium to large size foreign sales 
proportions, according to our definitions. 
                                                 
86 Jorion (1990) finds that the average magnitude of exchange rate exposure for oil firms is also much lower than non-
oil firms. 
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We receive similar results when we do a robust check using data of international assets (% of 
total assets) and international operation income (% of total income).87 In accounting, the data of 
these two factors face the same problems as the data of foreign sales faces, such as no clear cut 
between domestic and foreign operations because of transfer pricing and cost or asset allocation. 
Indeed, accounting rules favor derivative-based hedges only against identifiable foreign exchange 
exposures, favoring multinational and other companies with direct international transactions. 
The second hypothesis tests another debate: Which exchange rate index could represent the 
exchange rate movements that affect a firm's stock return?  Table 2.4 compares the results when 
we employ both the broad index and the major bilateral exchange rate indexes at portfolio-level 
estimations. Since the euro had not been introduced until 1999, the comparison is not presented 
from 1991 to 1998 in "Europe" and "Eurozone" panels. In Japan, the UK and eurozone, where only 
one major currency circulates, the broad index outperforms the bilateral exchange rate index at 
either 5% or 10% significant level for all three return horizons, although the bilateral exchange 
rate index also does a good job catching the exchange rate changes in some slot. In Europe, where 
both Euro and British pounds play an important role in foreign sales accounting, the broad index 
outperforms in short-term (3-month horizon) and the bilateral exchange rate index outperforms in 
long-term (12-month return horizon) estimations.  
In general, the broad index does a better job capturing comprehensively the exchange rate 
changes that affects a firm's stock return, at least on a short-term basis. This finding supports the 
explanation that firms may be exposed to currencies of countries where they are not operating 
through competition. The competitors of these firms may be incorporated in these currency 
countries, or some of these firms’ production inputs may be denominated in those currencies 
                                                 
87 Reports are available upon request. 
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(Muller and Verschoor, 2006c). From another perspective, firms may only hedge exposure to the 
more obvious currencies, but remain exposed to currencies of countries with whom their goods 
compete on world markets, but have no direct business (Dominguez and Tesar, 2001b). 
Table 2.5 gives a further summary of the number of firms that have consistent or inconsistent 
foreign sales locations and foreign currency exposures. Let's take the case that firms have foreign 
sales in Japan as an example. Among 532 sample US MNCs, 296 of them report they have foreign 
sales in Asia, while only 108 of them report they have foreign sales exactly in Japan. Although, 
the firm-level regression results indicate that 74 out of 532 sample firms have significant exchange 
exposure to Japanese Yen, we find that only 43 of them do have foreign sales in Asia and only 14 
of them do have foreign sales reported exactly in Japan. That means 31 out of 74 firms do not have 
any indicated foreign sales in Japan and Asia, but they are still showing significant exposures to 
Japanese Yen. Note here that as we mentioned in section 3.1 of sample selection and data, some 
firms may just report a few of their major foreign plants exactly and use word like "other" or "rest 
of the world" for other foreign plants. Hence, 31 firms may still have some foreign sales in Japan 
or Asia but we don't know exactly how many or where. We could only guess that it will be only a 
very small proportion when they included it in words like "other" instead of reporting it as a 
country or region separately. When we check further with the reported foreign sales data for these 
31 firms one by one, we are very sure that at least 4 of them have no foreign sales in Asia or Japan 
at all. 
Additionally, time horizon effects are robust at portfolio-level estimations in both Table 2.3 and 
2.4, as the magnitude of firms' exchange rate exposures become larger as the horizon lengthens 
and more significant exposure evidences are found using the 3-month instead of 1-month time 
horizon, but not necessarily the 12-month horizon. 
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We know that the effects exchange rate changes on a firm's cash flows are conventionally 
classified as either transaction or economic (operating) exposure. Transaction exposure usually 
affects cash flows in the short term. It happens between the time a transaction is "booked" and 
"settled". It is typically considered straightforward to evaluate and can be hedged through financial 
techniques, such as forward or futures contracts, money market hedge, options, or through 
operational techniques, such as currency risk sharing and re-invoicing centers. To the extent 
hedging is effective, the short-term effect of exchange rate changes on a firm's stock price is 
mitigated. Economic exposure usually affects cash flows in the long term. It is difficult to ascertain 
and is not easily hedged. The long-term effect of exchange rate changes will be built into a firm's 
stock price only as information about future cash flows are revealed over time. The operational 
strategies to hedge economic exposure including making market selection and price policies and 
diversifying operations also take time to take effect. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This article investigates several existing exchange rate risk exposure issues in the context of 
532 US MNCs with a new five-factor Fama-French model. The exchange exposure estimates are 
presented at both the firm- and portfolio-level. In the firm-level estimations, new evidence is 
provided to confirm that (1) one- and two-period lagged exchange rate changes show a strong 
explanatory power for US MNCs stock returns; (2) increases in the return horizon lead to increases 
in the precision of the estimates; and (3) the size of exchange rate movement itself, even when it 
is not associated with any crisis caused macroeconomic factor changes, will still affect the 
exposure estimates to a statistically significant level. In the portfolio-level estimations, we 
eliminate the key source of time-variant factors by making year-by-year portfolios by foreign sales 
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ratios and locations. We find that (1) the relationship between the foreign sales ratio and exchange 
exposure may not be linear, and (2) a broad exchange rate index captures the exchange rate changes 
more comprehensively in estimations, i.e., a firm could have statistically significant exposure to 
some currency even when it has no foreign sales in the country with that currency.   
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for the US MNCs Sample 
 Mean Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max 
Market capitalization (in million dollars) 7903.8 7.5 319.6 1137.4 4539.8 252763.9 
Total assets (in million dollars) 5649.1 9.4 271.2 982.7 3469.6 239535.0 
International assets (in million dollars) 1358.8 0.1 35.0 180.6 718.4 70895.4 
Total Sales (in million dollars) 5164.0 5.3 267.3 925.9 3707.5 217015.4 
Foreign sales (%) 38.5 3.2 25.4 38.4 50.0 97.4 
Number of firms (N)          532 
Foreign sales in Europe (N)          449 
Foreign sales in Euro Zone (N)          113 
Foreign sales in Asian (N)          296 
Foreign sales in Japan (N)          108 
Foreign sales in UK (N)          156 
Number of firms in industries (SIC 4-digit code) 
0000-0999: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing (N) 1 
1000-1999: Mining, Construction (N) 30 
2000-2999: Manufacturing (N) 103 
3000-3999: Manufacturing (N) 282 
4000-4999: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services (N) 13 
5000-5999: Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade (N) 29 
6000-6999: Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate (N) 0 
7000-7999: Services (N) 69 
8000-8999: Services (N) 5 
9000-9999: Public Administration (N) 0 
The table reports statistics on the examination sample of US MNCs. Market capitalization, total assets, international 
assets and total sales are in million dollars. Foreign sales (%) are the percentage of total sales. Q1, Q2 and Q3 refer to 
the 25% quartile, 50% quartile and 75% quartile respectively. Firms in the financial sector are not included. 
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Table 2.2 Various Effects on Firm-level Exchange Rate Exposure 
Panel A: Model effects  
Model 1 
0( )s f m f USDit t i i t t i t itR R R R X          
Model 2 
0( )s f m f USDit t i i t t i i i i i t itR R R R s SMB h HML X           
Model 3 
0( )s f m f USDit t i i t t i t i t i ti t itR R R R s SMB wWMLh HML X            
Model 4 
0( )s f m f USDit t i i t t i i i i i t i t i t itR R R R s SMB h HML rRMW c CMA X             
 Full sample Positive Negative Sig at 10% Sig at 5% 
 Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N + / ̶ N + / ̶ 
M1 
0
i  -0.371 1.062 166 0.559     0.818 366 -0.793     0.875 116 16/100 71 6/65 
M2 
0
i  -0.287    1.038 184 0.567     0.808 348 -0.739     0.844 103 21/82 72 9/63 
M3 
0
i  -0.258     1.012 189 0.568     0.779 343 -0.713     0.820 101 24/77 69 10/59 
M4 
0
i  -0.280 1.040 188 0.563 0.812 344 -0.741 0.849 107 24/83 74 11/63 
Panel B: Lagged effects 
0 1 2
1 2( )
s f m f USD USD USD
it t i i t t i i i i i t i t i t i t i t itR R R R s SMB h HML rRMW c CMA X X X                   
 Full sample Positive Negative Sig at 10% Sig at 5% 
 Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N + / ̶ N + / ̶ 
0
i  -0.264     1.121 187 0.623    0.939 345 -0.745     0.896 95 17/78 63 7/56 
1
i  -0.060    1.122 280 0.571     0.828 250 -0.760     0.982 58 34/24 22 12/10 
2
i  0.036     1.008 294 0.545     0.690 238 -0.592     0.985 35 24/11 16 12/4 
Total  -0.096    1.092 485 0.574     0.808 503 -0.706     0.949 156 72/110 86 31/68 
Panel C: Time horizon effects 
              
0( )s f m f USDit t i i t t i t itR R R R X          
 Full sample Positive Negative Sig at 10% Sig at 5% 
 Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N + / ̶ N + / ̶ 
1-m -0.412 1.063 160 0.528     0.813 372 -.815     .888 116 15/101 72 4/68 
3-m -0.325     1.282 190 0.665     0.710 342 -0.875     1.196 202 54/148 163 41/122 
12-m -0.699     2.291 173 1.326     1.455 359 -1.675     1.957 362 98/264 327 86/241 
Panel D: Large volatile effects  
( )s f m f JPY JPY EUR EUR GBP GBPit t i i t t i i i i i t i t i t i t i t itR R R R s SMB h HML rRMW c CMA X X X                 
 
No. of 
months 
JPY
i  
EUR
i  
GBP
i  Any i  
Sig. 
10% 
Sig. 
5% 
Sig. 
10% 
Sig. 
5% 
Sig. 
10% 
Sig. 
5% 
Sig. 
10% 
Sig. 
5% 
Full sample period 252 74 48 142 101 125 74 259 181 
Large volatile period 
(LVP) 
JPY 101 72 44 160 116 101 63 263 191 
EUR 109 67 38 152 109 123 74 265 183 
GBP 60 85 56 98 60 77 43 185 122 
Any LVP 169 82 47 130 102 113 65 250 173 
Normal period All 81 57 27 72 37 79 42 171 94 
The table reports the effects of model, lagged exchange rate changes, return time-horizons and large exchange rate 
volatiles at firm-level in Panel A, B, C and D, respectively. Label "total" in Panel B is a sum set of all non-duplicate 
firms showed in row labeled delta1, 2 and 3. The numbers of firms (N) that have significant exposure are reported at 
Newey-West corrected 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.3 Portfolio-level Exchange Rate Exposure by Foreign Sales Proportion 
Year 
No. 
Firm 
Small size 
 
0
i  No. 
Firm 
Medium size
  
0
i  No. 
Firm 
Large size 
 
0
i  
1-month 3-month 12-month 1-month 3-month 12-month 1-month 3-month 12-month 
1991 183  *  99 *   39  **  
1992 205 *** *** *** 83  *** *** 49    
1993 232   *** 95    42  *  
1994 269    109 *  *** 59    
1995 274    140 *** *** *** 67   *** 
1996 258   * 136 **  *** 56   *** 
1997 263  ***  135 *** *** *** 65    
1998 234  ** *** 106  *** *** 52  ***  
1999 209   *** 96   * 60  *  
2000 212    108 * *** *** 74 ** ** *** 
2001 201 ***   111 **  *** 65 **  *** 
2002 191    119  ** *** 76    
2003 171    131   * 95   * 
2004 145 *   151    88 * *** * 
2005 142 ** **  161 *** **  86 ** ***  
2006 130  *** *** 152 *** *** *** 83 ***  *** 
2007 118 ** *** * 138 * *** *** 84 **  *** 
2008 98    122   *** 85    
2009 100 ***   104 ***  *** 86  * *** 
2010 90  ***  132  *** ** 86  *  
2011 76    119  *** *** 94  ***  
Sig. 10% (*) 6/21=29% 8/21=38% 7/21=33%  11/21=52% 11/21=52% 17/21=81%  6/21=29% 10/21=48% 9/21=43% 
Sig. 5% (**) 5/21=24% 7/21=33% 5/21=24%  7/21=33% 11/21=52% 15/21=71%  5/21=24% 6/21=29% 7/21=33% 
Sig. 1% (***) 2/21=10% 5/21=24% 5/21=24%  5/21=24% 9/21=43% 14/21=67%  1/21=5% 4/21=19% 7/21=33% 
N + / ̶   8/13 10/11 12/8  3/18 8/13 8/12  5/16 8/13 7/13 
Mean + / ̶   0.44/-0.85 0.66/-0.87 1.07/-1.60  0.22/-0.61 0.48/-0.89 0.95/-0.56  0.44/-1.29 0.87/-1.92 1.55/-0.96 
SD + / ̶ 0.43/0.96 0.51/0.90 0.75/2.37  0.15/0.56 0.37/0.97 0.41/0.62  0.38/1.24 0.66/1.77 1.15/1.05 
The table shows how the size of foreign sales (% in total sales) affects exchange exposures at portfolio-level using five-factor model for 1-month horizon and two-
factor model for 3- and 12-month horizons. The sample firms are classified into three groups based on the breakpoints for the bottom 30% (small size), middle 40% 
(medium size) and top 30% (large size) of the percentage of a firm's foreign sales to total sales to make year-by-year firm portfolios. Estimates are for three different 
time horizons (3- and 12-month horizons are overlapping). Positive and negative exposures are reported separately. Significant exposures are reported at Newey-
West corrected 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.4 Portfolio-level Exchange Rate Exposure by Foreign Sales Area 
 
 
  
Japan Broad Japanese Yen
 
 UK Broad British Pound
 
Year No. Firm 1-m 3-m 12-m 1-m 3-m 12-m  Year No. Firm 1-m 3-m 12-m 1-m 3-m 12-m 
1991 11 ***   **    1991 11       
1992 14  *** **  ** *  1992 14 ***     ** 
1993 16   ** * *** ***  1993 19 ** ***  * **  
1994 18    *** *   1994 24    *   
1995 25 *** *  **    1995 25    **   
1996 27 ** ***  ** ***   1996 22  ***   *** * 
1997 29 ** **      1997 23  *** **   *** 
1998 45  ***   ***   1998 64   ***  *** * 
1999 56  ** ***  ** ***  1999 74   ***   * 
2000 53 ** *** ***  *** ***  2000 79  ** *  *** ** 
2001 55  * ***  ***   2001 80 **      
2002 60   ***  * ***  2002 90       
2003 63     *** **  2003 89     **  
2004 64  **    *  2004 89       
2005 68        2005 84 ***   **   
2006 72  *** ** *** *** **  2006 81 * *** ** **  *** 
2007 67  ** ***   ***  2007 77  ** *** **  ** 
2008 68  **   **   2008 70     *  
2009 70  ***   *** *  2009 71 ***   **  ** 
2010 72 ** ***   ***   2010 69  ***   ***  
2011 59  **      2011 59  **   **  
Sig. 10% (*) 29% 71% 38% 29% 67% 50%  Sig. 10% (*) 29% 38% 29% 33% 38% 43% 
Sig. 5% (**) 29% 62% 38% 24% 57% 33%  Sig. 5% (**) 24% 38% 24% 24% 33% 29% 
Sig. 1% (***) 10% 33% 24% 10% 43% 24%  Sig. 1% (***) 14% 24% 14% 0% 19% 10% 
N + / ̶ 12/9 11/10 11/9 8/13 9/12 8/12  N + / ̶ 7/14 8/13 13/7 7/14 11/10 14/6 
Mean + 0.79 0.90 2.12 0.47 0.88 0.75  Mean + 0.21 1.47 1.34 0.27 0.54 0.90 
Mean  ̶ -1.77 -2.95 -5.15 -0.52 -0.86 -1.95  Mean  ̶ -1.03 -1.14 -3.22 -0.52 -0.91 -2.04 
SD + 0.91 0.67 1.88 0.78 1.06 0.67  SD + 0.09 2.77 1.28 0.26 0.71 1.08 
SD  ̶ 2.57 3.15 7.24 0.57 1.00 1.61  SD  ̶ 1.00 1.37 3.50 0.54 0.80 2.49 
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Table 2.4 Portfolio-level Exchange Rate Exposure by Foreign Sales Area (continued) 
The table shows how the consistency between foreign sales area and exchange rate index affects exchange exposures at portfolio-level using five-factor model for 
1-month horizon and two-factor model for 3- and 12-month horizons which are overlapping. Four representative areas (Japan, the UK, Europe and Eurozone) are 
reported. In each area, we make year-by-year portfolios composed of the firms having foreign sales in that area. Positive and negative exposures are reported 
separately. Significant exposures are reported at Newey-West corrected 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Bold numbers are which outperform the 
corresponding numbers when the other exchange rate index is used.  
Europe Broad Euro
 
 Eurozone Broad Euro
 
Year No. Firm 1-m 3-m 12-m 1-m 3-m 12-m  Year No. Firm 1-m 3-m 12-m 1-m 3-m 12-m 
1991 178        1991 16       
1992 212        1992 15       
1993 229        1993 15       
1994 280        1994 18       
1995 313        1995 16       
1996 321        1996 16       
1997 324        1997 13       
1998 299        1998 31       
1999 277 ** *** ***  *** ***  1999 43 ** ** **  *** *** 
2000 272 ** *** **   ***  2000 47  **     
2001 282 ***  ** ***    2001 47       
2002 293  **  ***    2002 53       
2003 297  *  * ***   2003 57  **  * ***  
2004 293  *** ** ** ** ***  2004 53       
2005 289 *** ***   **   2005 57 * **    * 
2006 283 *** *** *** *** *** ***  2006 55  ***   ***  
2007 275  *** ***  *** *  2007 57  ** *  ***  
2008 256     *   2008 57       
2009 247 ***   ***  **  2009 59 ***   ***   
2010 234  ***   *** **  2010 57  ***   ***  
2011 193  *** * ** *** ***  2011 50    * *  
Sig. 10% (*) 46% 77% 54% 54% 69% 62%  Sig. 10% (*) 23% 54% 15% 23% 46% 15% 
Sig. 5% (**) 46% 69% 46% 46% 62% 54%  Sig. 5% (**) 15% 54% 8% 8% 38% 8% 
Sig. 1% (***) 31% 62% 23% 31% 46% 38%  Sig. 1% (***) 8% 15% 0% 8% 38% 8% 
N + / ̶   4/9 7/6 6/7 7/6 6/7 8/5  N + / ̶   3/10 3/10 7/6 7/6 5/8 8/5 
Mean + 0.12 0.48 0.92 0.25 0.39 1.28  Mean + 0.26 0.98 0.73 0.29 0.43 1.13 
Mean  ̶ -0.90 -1.37 -3.1 -0.29 -0.24 -0.71  Mean  ̶ -1.05 -1.16 -3.40 -0.31 -0.33 -0.73 
SD + 0.05 0.40 0.65 0.25 0.26 2.01  SD + 0.20 0.21 0.85 0.35 0.41 1.81 
SD  ̶ 0.91 1.23 4.78 0.35 0.20 0.83  SD  ̶ 0.81 1.14 3.90 0.30 0.35 0.43 
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Table 2.5 Consistency between Foreign Sales Locations and Exposed Currencies 
 JPY EURO GBP 
(a) No. firms having indicated foreign sales in area (Asia/Europe/Europe) 296 449 449 
(b) No. firms having indicated foreign sales in currency countries (Japan/Eurozone/UK) 108 113 156 
(c) No. firms having significant currency exposure (JPY/EURO/GBP) 74(48) 142(101) 125(74) 
(d) No. firms match (a) & (c) 43(26) 120(84) 102(58) 
(e) No. firms match (b) & (c) 14(10) 31(23) 29(19) 
(f) No. firms having significant currency exposure (JPY/EURO/GBP) but no indicated 
corresponding country/area sales 
31(22) 22(17) 23(16) 
(g) No. firms having significant currency exposure (JPY/EURO/GBP) but no corresponding 
country/area sales 
4(3) 4(2) 3(2) 
The table reports the number of firms with consistent and inconsistent foreign sales locations and foreign currency exposures. The numbers out of (in) parentheses 
are the numbers of firms having significant exposure at 10 (5%) level. 
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CHAPTER 3 IS CURRENCY REVALUATION CONTRACTIONARY IN CHINA? A 
VAR ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction  
The renminbi (RMB) exchange rate and Chinese exchange rate policy have received 
continuously extensive attention from the international community before and after 2008’s 
economic crisis. Is the RMB still undervalued after 2005’s revaluation88? If so, should the RMB 
be allowed to appreciate more? Will the RMB revaluation (appreciation) be contractionary in 
China? These questions have caused fierce debate internationally.  
The relationship between currency devaluation and output growth has been investigated in a 
number of studies but empirical findings of the effects of devaluation on the economy are mixed. 
According to the traditional textbook macroeconomic model, currency appreciations are 
contractionary: in the short run, currency appreciation will raise the price of domestic goods 
relative to the price of foreign goods (namely, real exchange rate appreciation), causing exports to 
drop and the substitution of home-produced goods with imported goods, thereby reducing 
aggregate demand. However, following Krugman and Taylor (1978), the New Structuralist School 
indicates that devaluation does not necessarily lead to an expansion, and by implication 
appreciation does not necessarily lead to a contraction. "On the demand side, the emphasis is on 
the expenditure-changing effects of exchange rate changes ignored by traditional macroeconomic 
theory, providing a series of mechanisms and channels through which devaluation can cause output 
                                                 
88 Currency revaluation is generally defined as an official upraising of the value of a country's currency within a fixed 
exchange rate system, by which the monetary authority formally sets a new fixed rate with respect to a foreign 
reference currency or currency basket. The opposite of revaluation, a change in the fixed rate making the foreign 
currency more expensive, is called a devaluation. Under a floating exchange rate, currency appreciation is an increase 
in a currency's value (relative to other major currency benchmarks) due to market forces, not government or central 
bank policy actions. In this study, Chinese central bank policy changes across sub-periods (see details in section 3.2). 
Related but distinct concepts include inflation, which is a market-determined decline in the value of the currency in 
terms of goods and services (related to its purchasing power). Altering the face value of a currency without reducing 
its exchange rate is a redenomination, not a devaluation or revaluation. 
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to drop. On the supply side, the literature demonstrates the contractionary devaluations affect 
mainly through the influence of devaluation on the cost of imported intermediate goods, wage 
costs, and firm's working capital. After the 1994 Mexico currency crisis and the 1997-98 East 
Asian financial crisis the contractionary devaluations literature gained renewed attention of 
economists" (Shi, 2008). For example, Edwards (1986), Agenor (1991), and Morley (1992) 
employ the fixed-effect approach; Kamin and Rogers (2000), Berument and Pasaogullari (2003), 
Ardiç (2006), and Kim and Ying (2007), employ the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach; and 
Chou and Chao (2001) and Bahmani-Oskooee and Kutan (2008) employ the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to examine the 
contractionary devaluations hypothesis. 
This paper will analyze the effects of the real RMB exchange rate on China’s output by applying 
VAR models to data from a time period spanning 1999q1-2010q2. The purpose of this paper is to 
disentangle the various factors leading to an observed negative correlation between exchange rate 
appreciation and output in China. These include (1) causality between the exchange rate and output, 
(2) spurious correlation with third factors, and/or (3) temporary contractionary or expansionary 
effects of appreciation. Such an analysis can determine whether, once those factors are accounted 
for, a positive, long-run effect of real depreciation on output can be identified. In so doing, we 
hope to shed light on the options for exchange rate policy facing China and other developing 
economies. In section 3.2, below, I provide a brief history of RMB exchange rate. Section 3.3 
looks at the bivariate relationship and causality between the variables of interest. In section 3.4, 
the vector autoregression models developed for the dynamic analysis of the data are formed and 
the results from the various models are explained. In the final section I summarize the findings. 
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3.2 A Brief History of the RMB Exchange Rate  
 Nominal Exchange Rate 
In the early 1990s, China implemented a double exchange rate system whereby an official fixed 
exchange rate coexisted with a market exchange rate formed in the swap foreign exchange market. 
By 1992, up to 80% of foreign exchange transactions were conducted in the swap foreign exchange 
market and the market exchange rate essentially reflected the demand for and supply of foreign 
exchange. The swap market exchange rate was higher (less expensive) than the official exchange 
rate, implying a subsidy to exporters. Consequently, the double exchange rate system caused unfair 
competition as well as resource-use distortion and was unfavorable to foreign direct investors. 
Against these negative effects, the official exchange rate of the RMB was increasing (devaluing) 
constantly, from 4.7 yuan per U.S. dollar in 1990, to 5.4 yuan per U.S. dollar in 1992, and to 5.8 
yuan per U.S. dollar by the end of 1993. (Shi, 2008) 
On January 1, 1994, China reformed its double exchange rate system by unifying the two 
exchange rates and established a single and managed floating exchange rate system based on 
market supply and demand. Afterwards, the nominal rate of the RMB went through disconnected 
modest periods of depreciation. This continued until 1997 when the East Asian financial crisis 
occurred. Under conditions where external demand dropped and the currencies of China’s 
principal trading partners depreciated against the U.S. dollar by a wide margin (except Hong Kong), 
market participants generally anticipated that the RMB would follow those currencies and 
depreciate. In order to stabilize regional exchange rates and prevent currencies from competitive 
devaluation, the Chinese Government announced against market expectation the RMB would not 
be devalued. From then on, the RMB exchange rate was fixed at 8.27 yuan per U.S. dollar, and the 
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so-called managed float became a de facto dollar peg. This system lasted until July, 2005. (Shi, 
2008) (See Figure 3.1) 
On July 21, 2005, the peg was finally lifted in favor of a managed float based on a basket of 
currencies. China instituted reform of its exchange rate regime by revaluing the RMB to 8.11 yuan 
per U.S. dollar and restricted its daily fluctuation to within 0.3% on both sides. However the peg 
was reinstituted unofficially when the economic crisis of 2008 hit. (See Figure 3.1) 
On June 19, 2010, the People’s Bank of China released a statement simultaneously in Chinese 
and English indicating that they would “proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate 
regime and increase the RMB exchange rate flexibility.” The RMB rose to its highest level in five 
years and markets worldwide surged on Monday, June 21 following China's announcement. As of 
August 31, 2010, the yuan is valued at 6.806 per US dollar. However China has simply shifted 
their reserves from dollar accounts to accounts in their competitor nations, leading these other 
nations to invest in dollars to keep their own currencies down. The result has been a lively debate 
on international currency. (See Figure 3.1) 
 
 Real Exchange Rate 
In contrast to the relative stability of the bilateral nominal rate of the RMB, the real effective 
exchange rate (hereafter referred to as the real exchange rate) of the RMB has fluctuated 
significantly. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, the real exchange rate of the RMB has gone through 
four stages over the past 12 years (1999-2010):  
(1) 1999Q4-2002Q1:89 a certain degree of appreciation of the RMB real exchange rate occurred 
in this period. This was due to mild inflation in China and deflation in its trade partners during 
                                                 
89 1998q2-1999q4: the RMB real exchange rate experienced a certain degree of depreciation, mainly because there 
appeared to be deflation in China. 
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this period. In 2002q1, the real exchange rate of the RMB rebounded to the previous level of 
1997q4. 
(2) 2002Q2-2005Q1: the RMB real exchange rate experienced a large depreciation. This was 
influenced mainly by the fact that the U.S. dollar depreciated against the Euro, the Japanese 
yen, and other key currencies, so the RMB also depreciated against those currencies. 
(3) 2005Q2-2009Q1: as a result of sustained fast economic growth and RMB nominal exchange 
rate appreciation, the RMB real exchange rate returned to a state of appreciation until economic 
crisis of 2008 hit. 
(4) 2009Q2-2010Q2: the dollar peg was reinstituted unofficially since 2009Q2 because of the 
economic crisis. Following the “U” shape routine of the U.S. dollar against the other major 
international currencies, the RMB real exchange rate depreciated in the last two quarters in 
2009 and appreciated back in the first two quarters in 2010. 
 
3.3 RMB Real Exchange Rate and China’s Output: Bivariate Analysis 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China’s cyclical 
output over the entire sample period (1999Q1-2010Q2). From the figure, we could see that 
appreciations of the real exchange rate seems have been associated with falls in cyclical output, 
while real depreciations have been followed by expansions in cyclical output. This is in accord 
with the forecast of traditional open economy macroeconomics where currency appreciations are 
contractionary, while currency depreciations are expansionary. However, the correlation is not 
clear or consistent over the entire sample period. For period of 2005Q2-2008Q1, we see that the 
correlation between the real exchange rate and output is not negative as usual but positive, i.e. 
appreciation of the real exchange rate is followed by output growth. 
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However, the observed correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China’s output 
seen in Figure 3.2 may still have various explanations: 
(1) Spurious correlation. The observed correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and 
China’s output could be simply reflecting the response of both variables to a third external 
variable when the two variables actually have nothing to do with each other. On one side, an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate could occur in response to excessive current account 
surplus, and the growing domestic imbalances could lead a recession in cyclical output. On the 
other, real exchange rate appreciations could occur in response to growing government 
spending,90 and so could expansions in cyclical output. 
(2) Causality running from output to the real exchange rate. Because many exchange rate-based 
stabilizations have been associated both with real appreciation and strong output growth, some 
analysts theorize that the expansion of aggregate demand that typically accompanies 
disinflation programs pushes up the price of non-traded goods — while tradable prices are 
fixed by the pegged exchange rate — thereby leading the real exchange rate to appreciate. 
However, because it takes time for aggregate demand to affect domestic prices and hence the 
real exchange rate, this hypothesis probably is best suited to explaining the longer term co-
movements of the exchange rate and output, particularly when the nominal exchange rate is 
fixed. 
(3) Causality running from the real exchange rate to output. Because the real exchange rate 
appreciation increases the prices of export goods and thus reduces the competitiveness in 
international trade, gross domestic product’s decrease as the demand of export goods decrease. 
                                                 
90 Models in the Mundell-Fleming tradition predict that an increase in government spending raises the real interest 
rate, leading to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. In contrast, the sticky-price inter-temporal models of the 
New Open Economy Macroeconomics predict a fall in the real interest rate in response to an increase in government 
spending, hence a depreciation of the real exchange rate. (Shi, 2008) 
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However, this contractionary effect on output may be slow and may be offset by reducing a 
country’s foreign-currency liabilities and increasing capital inflows. 
In order to answer these questions, we first evaluate the bivariate correlations between China’s 
quarterly output (real seasonally-adjusted GDP) and the real exchange rate (real effective exchange 
rate) from 1999Q1 through 2010Q2. Table 3.1 analyzes the correlations between the real exchange 
rate and output at various leads and lags. Because there is no general agreement about optimal 
transformation form of GDP, we use six different transformations, namely, logarithmic form, first 
difference of logarithmic form, deviation from a linear trend, deviation from a quadratic trend, 
deviation from a cubic trend, and deviation from the HP filter trend. Consistent with what is 
observed in Figure 3.2, in last three columns of Table 3.1, the real effective exchange rate is 
negatively correlated with real GDP at a four-period lag. That is, appreciations are associated with 
downturns in output, and depreciations with output growth. For the other filters, correlations 
appear to be somewhat stronger, running rather from lagged real exchange rates to GDP than vice-
versa, although the evidence is not clear-cut.  
Secondly, a preliminary pair-wise Granger causality test was conducted in order to examine the 
Granger causality between the RMB real exchange rate and China’s output. The Granger causality 
test indicates whether a set of lagged variables has explanatory power with respect to other 
variables. If the computed F-statistics are significant, we can claim in Granger’s sense that one 
variable Granger causes the other variable. Applied over the full sample, in Table 3.2, the tests 
indicate that lags of real GDP do not help to explain movements in real exchange rate, but lagged 
real exchange rates do help to explain real GDP in transformations of column (4) “deviation from 
a quadratic trend” and column (5) “deviation from a cubic trend”. Hence, the estimates support the 
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view that the correlation between real exchange rates and output reflects causality running from 
exchange rates to output, not vice-versa. 
We repeat the analysis for different subsamples, since the bivariate relationship between the 
real exchange rate and output might logically be affected by the exchange rate regime. According 
to RMB exchange rate regime history over 1999-2010, three subsamples are divided: 91  (1) 
1999Q1-2005Q1, when the nominal RMB exchange rate was de facto pegged to the U.S. dollar; 
(2) 2005Q2-2008Q2, when the nominal RMB exchange rate was reformed to a managed float 
based on a basket of currencies; (3) 2008Q3-2010Q2, when the dollar peg was reinstituted 
unofficially after the economic crisis of 2008. Separate Granger causality tests were conducted in 
each subsample. For the first subsample (1999Q1-2005Q1), there is no statistically significant 
causality relationship in either direction for all six transformation cases. This means that neither 
variable is helpful in explaining the movement of the other. However, for the second subsample 
(2005Q2-2008Q2), the data reject the null hypothesis with a 90% to 95% confidence in 
transformation cases (3), (4), (5), (6), suggesting that the real exchange rate does Granger causes 
real output but real output does not Granger cause the real exchange rate. For the third subsample 
(2008Q3-2010Q2), output does not Granger cause the real exchange rate; nor does the real 
exchange rate Granger cause output. Furthermore, we examined the fourth subsample (2005Q2-
2010Q2) which combined the second subsample and the third subsample together, but no 
improved results were found.  
The murky nature of our sub sample results highlights three issues. First, in any large system, 
bivariate correlations between two endogenous variables are likely not to remain constant over 
time. Second, if a particular relationship between two endogenous variables does prevail, 
                                                 
91 We also tried four subsamples divided by cutline 2002Q2, 2005Q2, and 2009Q2, according to RMB real exchange 
rate fluctuation history, but no meaningful results are found there. 
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identifying it requires a data sample sufficiently large to incorporate (Kamin and Rogers, 2000). 
Third, there might be other variables simultaneously influencing both the RMB real exchange rate 
as well as China’s output, thus limiting the usefulness of the pair-wise Granger causality test.92 
 
3.4 VAR Analysis 
  Model and Data  
3.4.1.1 The models 
The analysis above suggests that, for the full sample and the second subsample (2005Q2-
2008Q2), causality probably runs from the real exchange rate to output rather than vice-versa. 
However, the bivariate results do not exclude the possibility of spurious correlation, nor do they 
identify the channels by which the real exchange rate affects output. We now derive and estimate 
a VAR model that, (1) more clearly identifies the sources of shocks, and (2) more fully controls 
for important external shocks. 
Due to the relatively small sample size, not all variables of interest can be included within one 
VAR model.93 Therefore, the modeling strategy of Kamin and Rogers (2000) is adopted: a basic 
model is estimated first and then expanded by adding one external variable to the basic model at 
the time.  
The basic model (Model 1) below following Shi (2008) includes China's gross domestic product 
(Y), the RMB real effective exchange rate (E), China's inflation rate (I), and foreign gross domestic 
product (Yf): 
                                                 
92 We included 2 lags in the pair-wise Granger causality test in table 2. When we include 4 lags in the test, full sample 
results are getting murky but sub sample results of 2005Q2 to 2008Q2 in transformation cases (3), (4), (5), (6) are 
getting more statistically significant from 90%-95% to 95%-99%, and the rest results does not significantly change. 
93 Because a VAR model involves estimating quite a lot of parameters, introducing too many endogenous variables in 
one model will cause serious loss of degrees of freedom, thereby affecting the statistical dependability of the results 
(Shi, 2008). 
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Model 1: Yt
f, It, Et, Yt 
There are several considerations when selecting these four variables. China is an export-
oriented economy. After allowing convertibility of the RMB for current account transactions and 
formally joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the openness of China's real economy is 
constantly increasing. The ratio of foreign trade to GDP in China has now reached a high level of 
70%. In this situation, the business cycles of its trading partners have an important influence on 
China’s business cycles through import and export channels. Hence, Yf is appropriate as a proxy 
for major external shocks to the Chinese economy. On the other hand, China still implements 
capital controls. Therefore, the relationship between the U.S. interest rate and China’s interest rate 
should not be that close. The U.S. interest rate is not appropriate as the proxy for major external 
factors as it is in Kamin and Rogers (2000). Y and E are the variables of interest. Following the 
tradition of the business cycle literature, the gross domestic product data are de-trended so as to 
focus upon the growth cycle. Therefore, Y and Yf represent the cyclical components of the gross 
domestic product of China and foreign countries respectively. Inflation (I) is the “intermediate” 
variable in-between the real effective exchange rate and output, as a proxy for all possible channels 
for linking the real exchange rate to output.  
The model variables are ordered in a particular sequence as above, and variables higher in the 
ordering are assumed to cause contemporaneous changes in variables lower in the order. Variables 
lower in the ordering are assumed to affect variables higher in the ordering only with a lag. Due to 
the openness of the Chinese economy, Yt
f is ordered first because Yt
f captures the external shocks 
that may have significant contemporaneous effects on Chinese economic variables such as It, Et, 
and Yt. On the other hand, the outputs of China’s trade partners as a whole are unlikely to be 
affected contemporaneously by any Chinese economic variables. For It, Et, and Yt, differently from 
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the ordering in Kamin and Rogers (2000), we followed the ordering in Shi (2008). Since the RMB 
nominal exchange rate is stable due to high official intervention, the inflation rate is ordered prior 
to RMB real exchange rate and GDP by assuming that inflation shocks have a contemporaneous 
effect on the RMB real exchange rate and on aggregate demand. In contrast, it is assumed that 
prices are sticky in the short run, so that they respond to the real exchange rate and aggregate 
demand shocks only with lags. Et is ordered prior to Yt because it is assumed that real exchange 
rate shocks have a contemporaneous effect on aggregate demand through either traditional 
channels or those indicated by the “contractionary devaluations” literature, while aggregate 
demand shocks do not contemporaneously affect the real exchange rate.  
Additionally, other VAR models (Model 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) are estimated. This determines 
whether the final results are robust, while allowing for control of the size of the VAR model within 
the appropriate level according to the sample. According to model 2, 4, 5 and 6, money supply (Mt) 
and capital account (Kt) are entered into the basic model, respectively, to examine monetary 
channels and capital controls in the relationship between real exchange rates and output.94 Model 
3, 5 and 6 include the U.S. interest rate (RUS) and oil price, respectively, as exogenous variables to 
allow investigation of the international financial linkages of the Chinese economy, and 
examination of the efficiency of capital controls in China. Therefore, besides the basic model 
(Model 1), five more VAR models are estimated. The models can be expressed in the form of an 
unrestricted VAR model as follows: 
Model 2: Yt
f, Mt, It, Et, Yt 
Model 3: RUS, Yt
f, It, Et, Yt 
                                                 
94 We would like to enter government spending and current account to examine fiscal and trade channels in the 
relationship between real exchange rates and output, but quarterly data of government spending and current account 
of China is not available. 
   
98 
 
Model 4: Yt
f, Kt, It, Et, Yt 
 Model 5: RUS, Kt, It, Et, Yt 
Model 6: Ot, Kt, It, Et, Yt 
In Model 2, Mt is ordered prior to It under the assumption that as the monetary policy instrument 
in China, the money supply reacts, not to realized inflation but to expected inflation. In Model 3 
and 5, RUS is ordered prior to Yt
f and Kt because U.S. interest rate shocks contemporaneously affect 
world aggregate demand, but due to the relative independence of the U.S. economy, the U.S. 
interest rate is unlikely to be contemporaneously affected by world aggregate demand or any 
Chinese economic variables. In Model 4, Kt is ordered prior to It since, as China has capital controls 
throughout our entire sample period, the capital account is unlikely to be contemporaneously 
affected by other Chinese economic variables. In the last Model, Ot is ordered prior to Kt since oil 
price shocks are independent of Chinese economic variables Kt, It, Et, and Yt. 
 
3.4.1.2 Data 
We employed quarterly data from 1999q1-2010q2 because of data availability: 1999q1 is the 
earliest time for which quarterly gross domestic product data are available for China from the 
International Financial Statistics database. Y and Yf are seasonally adjusted real gross domestic 
products. The base period is 2005. Yf is calculated according to the trade-weighted average of the 
gross domestic product indices of seven principal trade partners of China.95 In the business cycle 
literature, the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter is widely used to generate the cyclical components. It 
is well known, however, that the H-P filter has an end-of-sample problem, such that at the end of 
the sample the estimates are particularly unreliable. In addition, the filter depends on the choice of 
                                                 
95 Seven principal trade partners of China are the United States (27.7%), Japan (21.3%), Hong Kong (16.2%), South 
Korea (14.5%), Germany (9.8%), Australia (5.5%), and Malaysia (5%). 
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the “smoothness parameter”, which makes the resulting cyclical component and its statistical 
properties highly sensitive to this choice. These problems become serious when the sample size is 
small. Because of the relatively small sample, the H-P filter is not used in this study. Instead, 
quadratic de-trending was used to construct the Y and Yf data, which is implemented by regressing 
the logarithm of quarterly real gross domestic product on a trend and its square. In this study, the 
regression with a quadratic time trend provides a better fit than one with a linear time trend.  
E is the real effective exchange rate with an increase indicating an appreciation. Inflation rate, 
I, is the percentage change of the China consumer price index. M is China's real broad money 
supply (M2).96 RUS indicates the U.S. nominal interest rate based on the three month Treasury Bills 
rate. K is the ratio of the capital account to gross domestic product. O is Dubai Crude oil current 
price ($/bbl).97 Except for I, K, and RUS, the variables are in logarithms. All the data are obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics Database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
except for oil price which comes from Global Economic Monitor of the World Bank. 
 
 Unit Root Tests 
To avoid spurious regressions, the time-series of relevant variables in the models need to be 
tested for stationarity. If the variables turn out to be non-stationary, it then has to be determined 
whether long-run steady relations among those endogenous variables exist.  
Both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron test are used for unit 
root tests. Table 3.3 reports the results of the unit root tests of variables of interest, namely, the 
                                                 
96 M2 is a measure of the money supply that includes all elements of M1 (cash and checking deposits) as well as short-
term time deposits and 24-hour money market funds. Economists like to include the more broadly defined definition 
for M2 when discussing the money supply, because modern economies often involve transfers between different 
accounts types, which means M2 is relatively stable than M1.  
97 Dubai Crude oil price is used primarily in Asia market basket. 
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real exchange rate, inflation rate, real output, and a set of control variables, including real money 
supply, capital account size, trade weighted GDP of foreign countries, U.S. interest rate, and 
international oil price. For the level variables, both tests reveal that the presence of a unit root 
cannot be rejected except the ADF test result of inflation rate, which shows that all of these 
variables are non-stationary. On the other hand, the Phillips-Perron test rejects the null hypothesis 
of presence of a unit root at the 1% level of significance for the first difference of all variables 
except U.S. interest rate at the 5% level, while the ADF test rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% 
level of significance for inflation rate, real output, capital account size, and international oil price, 
at the 5% level of significance for the real exchange rate, real money supply, and trade weighted 
GDP of foreign countries. The ADF test cannot reject the null hypothesis for U.S. interest rate with 
two-lag orders, but can reject it with four-lag orders at the 5% level. Therefore, it can be asserted 
that all variables in our models are first order integrated variables, namely variables of I(1). 
 
 Cointegration Tests 
Because all of the variables in the models were variables of I(1), further testing is conducted to 
determine if there are cointegration vectors for each model. VAR-based cointegration tests are 
implemented using the methodology developed in Johansen (1995). Table 3.4 reports the results 
of Johansen cointegration tests with both Trace statistics and Maximum Eigenvalue statistics, 
indicating that there is only one cointegration vector for each VAR model.98 Therefore, non-
stationary data are of less concern in this study. In fact, as elaborated in Sims, Stock, and Watson 
(1990), when variables are co-integrated, using a VAR in levels model is specified, and the 
estimates are consistent. Some economists suggest that when one really does not know whether 
                                                 
98 If the results of the two test statistics are not consistent, go with the trace statistics. 
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there is co-integration or what the co-integration vector is, the VAR in levels approach is probably 
better than the approach that tests for co-integration, estimates co-integrating relationships, and 
then estimates a vector error correction model (VECM) (Cochrane, 2005). This suggestion was 
followed, and the study is conducted on the relationship between the RMB real exchange rate and 
China’s output by using a VAR in levels model. 
 
 Variance Decompositions 
Table 3.5 presents the variance decompositions of China’s output and the RMB real exchange 
rate. These give the fraction of the forecast error variance for each variable that is attributable to 
its own innovations and to innovations in the other variables in the system. Each column provides 
the variance decompositions estimated from one of the six models described above; results are 
reported for forecast horizons 1, 10, and 20 (quarters). Each row represents the fraction of the 
forecast error variance attributable to innovations in the variable listed in the first column. For 
example, in model 1, at the 1-quarter forecast horizon, 70.44% of the variance in real output is 
attributable to its own shocks, 1.99% is to shocks to the real exchange rate, 0.16% is to shocks to 
inflation, and 27.41% is to shocks to the trade partner’s income. 
 
3.4.4.1 Variance Decompositions of Real Output 
In all models except model 2, the predominant source of variation in China’s output forecast 
errors are its own shocks----these generally account for around 40%-70% of the forecast error 
variance, depending on the forecast horizon. The second most important source of variation in 
China’s output forecast error is the real exchange rate, whose shocks account for around 20%-40% 
at the 20-quarter forecast horizon. The shocks to the other variables in the model----inflation, 
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capital account, trade partner’s income, US interest rates, and oil prices----explain around 1%-6%, 
13%-17%, 4%-21%, 12%-15%, and 5% of real China’s output forecast error variation respectively, 
at the 20-quarter forecast horizon. 
Different from other models, when M2 is included in model 2, shocks to the real money supply, 
with a contribution 47.02% at the 20-quarter forecast horizon, replace shocks to output as the most 
important source of variation in China’s output forecast errors. Shocks to the trade partner’s 
income, China’s output, and real exchange rate become the second, third, and fourth most 
important sources. We tried several models including M2 but with different Cholesky order or 
with different variables and the results of them show that as long as M2 is included in the model, 
shocks to money supply contributes the largest proportion to the variation in China’s output 
forecast errors.99  
The capital account is another important source explaining China’s output forecast error 
variation. In model 1 and 3 which do not include the capital account, the contribution of real 
exchange rate shocks to the variance of output forecast errors is 40%-45% at the 20-quarter horizon, 
while in models 4, 5, and 6 which include the capital account, the contribution of real exchange 
rate shocks decreases to 20%-35% at the same quarter horizon. This indicates that when the capital 
account is not taken into account, the real exchange rate emerges as a key determinant of 
macroeconomic developments in China; however, when the capital account is taken into account, 
although the real exchange rate shocks are still the second most important source of variation in 
China’s output, its contribution proportion becomes about 10% less. 
 
                                                 
99 We tried Model a: Yf, I, M, E, Y; Model b: Yf, I, E, M, Y; Model c: RUS M, I, E, Y; Model d: O, M, I, E, Y in 
Cholesky order. 
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3.4.4.2 Variance Decompositions of the Real Exchange Rate 
In variance decompositions of real exchange rate, the predominant source is its own shocks too-
---these generally account for around 40%-70% of the forecast error variance, depending on the 
forecast horizon. Besides, shocks to inflation contribute around 15%-20% of variance in the real 
exchange rate forecast errors in models 1, 2, 4, and 6, but this proportion goes down to around 6% 
if the U.S. interest rate is included such as in models 3 and 5. At the meantime, U.S. interest rate 
shocks become the second most important source of variation in the real exchange rate forecast 
errors, accounting for about 25%-30% in models 3 and 5. Shocks to capital account, trade partner’s 
income, and oil prices are all account for around 10%-20% of variance in the real exchange rate 
forecast errors in six models. Finally, shocks to real output contribute only 5%-10% to the real 
exchange rate forecast errors.  
These results suggest that reverse causality from real output to the real exchange rate does not 
appear to have been important, nor does spurious correlation of devaluations and output with oil 
shocks or US interest rates. Additionally, it is evident that shocks to the money supply have been 
important to movements in output and shocks to U.S. interest rates have been important to 
movements in the real exchange rate. 
 
 Impulse Responses 
Figures 3.3-3.8 contain the impulse-response function graphs of levels of variables in all six 
models, respectively. In each figure, the responses of a particular variable to a one-time shock in 
each of the variables in the system are combined to be displayed by different pattern lines in each 
panel. For example, by comparing the last panel in each figure, we could determine whether the 
estimated response of China’s output to a particular shock is robust with respect to changes in 
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model specification. In each figure, the response to real exchange rate shocks is displayed as the 
thick dashed line. 
In line with the findings of previous sections, a positive (appreciation) shock to the level of the 
real exchange rate leads to a sustained reduction in the level of real output, recalling that we used 
a real effective exchange rate in our study. This sustained effect is consistent across all of the 
models estimated. In particular, it is not diminished by inclusion of variables in the system that 
might simultaneously induce appreciation and increase output: oil prices, the broad money supply, 
and the capital account. However, in models 3 and 5, the effect of real exchange rate shocks is 
slightly diminished by including U.S. interest rates in the models. Output starts to grow back to its 
normal level since the 16-quarter (four years) and 6-quarter (a year and a half) in model 3 and 5, 
respectively, but it appears a long and painful process. Furthermore, in models 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, 
the output decrease response happens at the same moment when the real exchange rate shock 
attacks. While in model 4, by inclusion of the trade partner’s income and capital account together, 
there is no decreased jump at the 0-quarter time point.  
Model 2 shows a different future in its output response path to the real exchange rate shock. In 
the last panel of figure 3.4, the output has an immediately negative response to the real exchange 
rate shock at the 1-quarter horizon. However, it returns to the normal level quickly and surprisingly 
within two quarters. Since the 3-quarter, the output starts to decrease again until the 8 to 9-quarter 
and then it goes back gradually to its normal level near the 20-quarter. The path of output response 
indicates that in a model including the board money supply variable, the real exchange rate 
appreciation shock has a contractionary effect in the short run, but at some time point within, it 
might show a neutral effect on the output.  
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Almost all the other estimated impulse-response functions are sensible and consistent with the 
illustrative framework outlined earlier. Increases in the trade partner’s income tend to have a 
comparatively large positive effect on the real output, but this effect usually becomes 50% smaller 
after two years. Inflation shocks generally have a positive effect on the real output within two-year 
horizon but a negative effect beyond a two-year horizon, except in model 5. This indicates that 
inflation might raise domestic consumption demand via increased nominal wage in the short run, 
but it finally harms the output growth in the long run. Increases in real M2 tend to raise the real 
output increasingly, while increases in US interest rates and oil prices usually reduce output 
increasingly over time. Increases in the ratio of capital account to output have a negative effect on 
the real output. If we take the zero-effect line as an axis of symmetry, a “Ʌ” shape effect path of 
capital account below the zero-effect line is generally symmetrical to a “V” shape of the effect 
path of real M2 above the zero-effect line. This shows that the effects of the broad money supply 
shock and the capital account shock on China’s output are opposite.  
The responses of the other variables to real exchange rate are displayed in the count back second 
panel in each figure. Increases in output have a permanent positive effect on the real exchange rate 
in the long run. However, in models 5 and 6 which includes U.S. interest rates or oil prices with 
the capital account, this effect is negative in the short run before it turns to positive in the long run. 
A positive inflationary shock appreciates the real exchange rate only in the short run, while a 
positive shock in the trade partner’s income depreciates the real exchange rate in the short run and 
appreciates it in the intermediate run. An increase in the U.S. interest rate tends to attract Chinese 
RMB flows into the U.S. financial market and depreciate the real exchange rate in the short run, 
since the nominal exchange rate is a managed float or fixed in such a short period. In the 
intermediate run, however, the real exchange rate appreciates follows the real dollar exchange rate 
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appreciation. Capital account shocks have a positive effect on the real exchange rate in the short 
and intermediate run but a neutral effect in the long run. This positive effect can be easily explained 
since foreign direct investment increases international reserves and thereby appreciates the real 
exchange rate. Through the monetary channel, a positive shock in the board money supply will 
appreciate the real exchange rate through increased inflation in the short run and depreciate the 
real exchange rate in the intermediate run when the increased M2 has been absorbed by the 
economy. The response of the real exchange rate to oil prices is negative in the very short run since 
currency purchase power decreases after oil prices increases. In the period of a half to three years, 
the real exchange rate starts to appreciate responding to oil price increases via capital account 
channels. 
As noted above, the impulse-response functions provide some clues to the specific mechanisms 
by which real devaluation affects output. Appreciation appears to affect output through its impact 
on inflation, capital account, and money supply. Appreciation works consistently to reduce 
inflation within a three-year period. Then decreasing inflation reduces the real output within 
approximately two years and increases the real output after that. The effect of appreciation on the 
capital account and board money supply are positive within around three years. However, increases 
in the capital account and money supply make the real output go in opposite directions. The 
positive shock to the capital account makes real output drop while the positive shock to money 
supply makes real output rise. The negative effect on the capital account is larger than the positive 
effect on the board money supply in the short run, but the positive effect on the board money 
supply is larger than the negative effect on the capital account in the long run.100 These results 
                                                 
100 We also tried some additional extended models, “Yf, M, K, I, E, Y”, “RUS M, K, I, E, Y”, “O, M, K, I, E, Y”, and 
models with K and M order exchanged, “Yf, K, M, I, E, Y”, “RUS, K, M, I, E, Y”, and “O, K, M, I, E, Y”. The results 
of them are consistent with our conclusions. 
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suggest that the effects of appreciation in China may be so pervasive that no single, predominant 
channel of causation linking the real exchange rate and output can be identified. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we have investigated the negative relationship between the real effective exchange 
rate and output in China over the years 1999-2010. We first analyzed the bivariate relationship 
between the set of the variables of interest, and then analyzed whether a long-term relationship 
exists between the real exchange rate, inflation, and output. Several VAR models were estimated 
thereafter, and the forecast error variance decompositions and impulse responses obtained from 
the VAR models were examined.  
In the bivariate analysis, for most of the transformations, we observe a negative correlation 
between output and the real effective exchange rate. And through the Granger causality test, we 
find that it is the movements of real effective exchange rate Granger cause the responses of real 
output. We also find that at least one long-run relationship exists among the real exchange rate, 
inflation and output. By employing various VAR models for the sample period----including the 
variables of U.S. interest rate, oil prices, capital account, money supply, the real exchange rate, 
inflation, output----we found that the response of output to a real appreciation is based not only on 
one single predominant channel but on several different channels, such as current account channel, 
capital account channel, monetary channel. These findings also hold in the alternative settings in 
which the possible effects of external variables are controlled.  
Additionally, we acknowledge that our finding may not be sufficient to draw straightforward 
policy implications from our results. For example, a finding that real devaluation raises growth 
does not necessarily provide the basis for targeting the exchange rate at a highly competitive level, 
   
108 
 
since such a target may be very inflationary. Conversely, a finding that real appreciation is 
contractionary does not mean that the authorities should discourage real exchange rate appreciation. 
China is a typical export-oriented economy that has been successfully using the real exchange rate 
as a development-relevant policy tool. But there may costs as well as benefits of keeping the real 
exchange rate low, especially if the authorities stick with the policy for too long. “Sticking with 
the policy may fan tensions with other countries. It may entail the accumulation of large amounts 
of relatively low-yielding foreign exchange reserves and using national resources that are devoted 
to other purposes. It may mean that the adjustment ultimately comes about via a costly and 
financially-disruptive inflation. This suggests that countries seeking to use a competitive exchange 
rate to jump-start growth also need to develop an exit strategy to avoid getting locked into a 
strategy that has outlived its usefulness” (Eichengreen, 2007). How to reform the structure of 
balance-of-payments and find an appropriate exit strategy is what Chinese policy makers should 
consider while they are implementing RMB appreciation.  
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Table 3.1 Cross Correlations of Real GDP and Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Lag Log 
form  
First 
difference of 
log form 
Deviation 
from linear 
trend 
Deviation 
from 
quadratic 
trend 
Deviation 
from cubic 
trend 
Deviation 
from HP 
filter 
trend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
4 0.376 -0.159 0.654 0.412 0.469 0.438 
3 0.376 -0.154 0.600 0.296 0.349 0.360 
2 0.365 -0.015 0.554 0.172 0.225 0.282 
1 0.340 -0.017 0.479 -0.006 0.056 0.144 
0 0.317 -0.062 0.384 -0.207 -0.139 -0.018 
-1 0.234 0.089 0.281 -0.313 -0.248 -0.118 
-2 0.166 0.217 0.184 -0.422 -0.362 -0.215 
-3 0.107 0.144 0.091 -0.529 -0.473 -0.307 
-4 0.034 0.073 0.021 -0.570 -0.524 -0.340 
Note: The positive (negative) lag number indicates that the number of quarters by which the real exchange rate is 
leaded (lagged) relative to real GDP. 
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Table 3.2 Granger Causality Test Results 
 Log 
form  
First 
difference 
of log form 
Deviation 
from 
linear 
trend 
Deviation 
from 
quadratic 
trend 
Deviation 
from 
cubic 
trend 
Deviation 
from HP 
filter trend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full sample       
Real GDP Real ER 1.604 
(0.214) 
0.978 
(0.385) 
2.314 
(0.112) 
1.628 
(0.209) 
1.597 
(0.215) 
1.832 
(0.174) 
Real ER  Real GDP 1.804 
(0.178) 
0.011 
(0.990) 
0.361 
(0.699) 
3.174 
(0.053) 
3.152 
(0.054) 
1.170 
(0.321) 
Sub1: 1999q1-2005q1       
Real GDP Real ER 1.114 
(0.350) 
0.172 
(0.843) 
0.863 
(0.439) 
0.740 
(0.491) 
0.642 
(0.538) 
0.792 
(0.468) 
   Real ER  Real GDP 0.547 
(0.588) 
0.075 
(0.928) 
0.833 
(0.451) 
1.348 
(0.285) 
1.343 
(0.286) 
1.030 
(0.377) 
Sub2: 2005q2-2008q2       
Real GDP Real ER 4.489 
(0.049) 
0.028 
(0.972) 
2.214 
(0.172) 
0.887 
(0.449) 
1.207 
(0.348) 
0.663 
(0.541) 
Real ER  Real GDP 0.966 
(0.421) 
1.678 
(0.246) 
3.125 
(0.099) 
4.885 
(0.041) 
4.714 
(0.044) 
4.130 
(0.059) 
Sub3: 2008q3-2010q2       
   Real GDP Real ER 0.283 
(0.771) 
0.348 
(0.731) 
0.433 
(0.684) 
0.365 
(0.721) 
0.354 
(0.728) 
0.425 
(0.688) 
   Real ER  Real GDP 1.873 
(0.297) 
3.258 
(0.177) 
1.671 
(0.325) 
1.356 
(0.381) 
1.344 
(0.383) 
1.440 
(0.365) 
Sub4: 2005q2-2010q2       
   Real GDP Real ER 8.189 
(0.004) 
0.495 
(0.619) 
4.193 
(0.034) 
0.366 
(0.699) 
0.408 
(0.672) 
1.209 
(0.325) 
   Real ER  Real GDP 0.506 
(0.612) 
0.055 
(0.946) 
0.029 
(0.971) 
1.445 
(0.265) 
1.491 
(0.255) 
0.418 
(0.665) 
Note: Two lags are included in the tests. P-values are reported next to F-statistics, in parentheses. 
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Table 3.3 Unit Root Test Results 
 Level First Difference 
 ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test 
Yt -2.542 -2.012 -4.149*** -6.565*** 
Et -0.781 -0.909 -3.289** -4.174*** 
It -3.656*** -2.299 -3.712*** -3.788*** 
Yt
f  -1.998 -2.420 -3.801** -6.703*** 
Mt -0.452 -0.731 -3.985** -5.533*** 
 Kt -1.667 -2.264 -5.110*** -8.724*** 
RUS -2.313 -1.075 -2.055 -3.115** 
Ot -2.437 -3.086 -4.184*** -5.106*** 
Note: In both the ADF test and the Phillips-Perron test, we use two-lag orders. For Y, Yf, M, and O, we report results 
of ADF test with trend, while for E, I, K, and RUS, we report results of ADF test without trend. * denotes the rejection 
of the hypothesis at the 10% level of significance, ** denotes 5% level, and *** denotes 1% level. 
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Table 3.4 Conintegration Test Results 
Model Trace Statistics λ-max Statistics 
H0:r = 0 
H1:r ≥ 1 
r ≤ 1 
r ≥ 2 
H0: r = 0 
H1: r = 1 
r ≤ 1 
r = 2 
1 44.575(0.098) 21.631(0.320) 22.944(0.176) 14.715(0.309) 
2 66.197(0.094) 40.817(0.195) 25.380(0.360) 21.066(0.272) 
3 95.085(0.000) 42.930(0.134) 52.154(0.000) 23.214(0.165) 
4 66.271(0.093) 37.020(0.347) 29.251(0.162) 27.584(0.377) 
5 79.647(0.007) 40.006(0.222) 39.641(0.009) 17.371(0.548) 
6 76.294(0.014) 36.830(0.356) 39.464(0.010) 20.508(0.307) 
Note: MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3.5 Variance Decompositions 
Shock  
(horizon) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(1) (10) (20) (1) (10) (20) (1) (10) (20) 
Variance decompositions of Yt 
Yt 70.44 52.72 46.91 63.39 34.37 18.82 56.25 43.47 38.81 
Et 1.99 32.34 43.03 1.30 9.53 7.13 4.64 34.16 39.55 
It 0.16 3.22 3.76 0.11 8.48 5.61 1.73 1.44 0.79 
Mt ̶ ̶ ̶ 3.37 15.45 47.02 ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Kt ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
 Yt
f 27.41 11.72 6.30 31.84 32.17 21.42 34.07 17.22 9.06 
RUS ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 3.31 3.72 11.79 
Ot ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Variance decompositions of Et 
Yt 0.00 1.83 4.55 0.00 8.10 8.38 0.00 2.02 2.45 
Et 96.09 70.63 67.27 86.3 55.65 51.66 93.23 66.17 49.92 
It 3.36 19.37 18.41 2.38 16.29 15.18 0.00 2.74 6.39 
Mt ̶ ̶ ̶ 9.47 2.57 2.89 ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Kt ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
 Yt
f 0.55 8.17 9.78 1.85 17.39 21.89 0.00 13.45 13.33 
RUS ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 6.77 15.62 27.92 
Ot ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
 
Shock  
(horizon) 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
(1) (10) (20) (1) (10) (20) (1) (10) (20) 
Variance decompositions of Yt 
Yt 54.16 50.38 44.55 71.64 62.89 53.04 71.75 59.77 51.04 
Et 0.02 30.59 36.05 1.33 20.97 18.25 3.16 21.81 26.39 
It 1.05 2.50 1.69 0.34 1.44 1.80 3.16 2.17 1.65 
Mt ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Kt 17.14 8.96 13.97 21.97 9.54 12.36 21.62 12.48 16.42 
 Yt
f 27.63 7.56 3.73 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
RUS ̶ ̶ ̶ 4.71 5.16 14.55 ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Ot ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 0.32 3.77 4.50 
Variance decompositions of Et 
Yt 0.00 1.71 4.47 0.00 3.22 7.12 0.00 1.10 5.84 
Et 85.24 66.76 63.82 85.63 60.54 45.50 72.16 44.66 42.06 
It 1.64 15.19 14.74 0.09 3.61 6.15 11.39 18.43 18.27 
Mt ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Kt 12.85 8.98 9.20 6.18 18.06 14.48 11.95 23.52 22.35 
 Yt
f 0.27 7.36 7.77 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
RUS ̶ ̶ ̶ 8.10 14.58 26.76 ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Ot ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 4.50 12.29 11.48 
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Figure 3.1 Renminbi Exchange Rate 
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Figure 3.2 Renminbi Exchange Rate and Output 
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Figure 3.3 Impulse Response of Variables in Model 1 
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Figure 3.4 Impulse Response of Variables in Model 2 
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Figure 3.5 Impulse Response of Variables in Model 3 
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Figure 3.6 Impulse Response of Variables in Model 4 
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Figure 3.7 Impulse Response of Variables in Model 5 
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Figure 3.8 Impulse Response of Variables in Model 6 
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